EVENTS LEADING UP
TO THE REFERENDUM
FROM 1897 – 1933
As is well known, Benin City, capital of the independent
Benin Kingdom and Empire, and traditional spiritual center
of Edo speaking people fell to British troops on February 19,
1897. From that day onwards we became part of the British
colonial system and whatever administrative structures its
agents and latter day surrogates created. The last
independent Oba, Idugbowa Ovonramwen Ogbaisi, was
deported to Calabar on September 13th, 1897, where he died
in 1914. [Jacob Egharevba: A Short History of Benin.
Ibadan University Press, 1968, p60]
In the meantime, Benin was administered as part of the Niger
Coast Protectorate, which later became the Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria in 1900. From 1906 “Southern Nigeria”
was administered as three main provinces, Western, Central
and Eastern, along with the Lagos colony with which it had
been merged that year. The Eastern province was run from
Calabar, the Central Province from Warri, and the Western
Province from Lagos. The Central Province was also known
as the Niger province. It consisted of the Aboh, Agbor,
Asaba, Awka, Benin, Forcados, Idah, Ifon, Ishan, Kwale,
Okwoga, Onitsha, Sapele, Udi and Warri districts. The
protectorate of Northern Nigeria, on the other hand, was
initially organized into 13 provinces (run by Provincial
residents) before Ilorin and Kabba were merged into one.
According to the “Anthropological Report on the Edo
speaking peoples” by Northcote Thomas in 1910, Edo-
speaking peoples were mainly located in the Central
Province of “Southern Nigeria” and the Ibie and Ukpilla
districts of Kabba province of “Northern Nigeria.”
The protectorates and colonies of Northern and Southern
Nigeria were later amalgamated on January 1st 1914 to
create “Nigeria”. [FD Lugard: Report on the Amalgamation
of Northern and Souther Nigeria, and administration, 1912
– 1919. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920]. In Benin, after a 17
year interregnum, Prince Aiguobasimwin, (also known as
Ovbiudu – the courageous one) eldest son of Oba
Ovonramwen, was crowned Oba Eweka II on July 24, 1914.
Indeed, the splendor of that coronation ceremony is what
initially triggered the interest of the late Jacob Egharevba to
write down the history of his people. Dr. Ekhaguosa Aisien
has eloquently discussed the remarkable story of how Eweka
II regained the throne against incredible odds in his paper “
Edo Man of the Twentieth
Century.”[http://www.dawodu.net/aisien.htm]
The Ibie and Ukpilla districts of Kabba province of
“Northern Nigeria”
were merged with their kith and kin in the Benin province of “
Southern Nigeria” in 1918.
After 1897, the opening of core traditional Benin lands to so-
called “legal trade” in Oil Palm and Forestry by British
agents and surrogates created new opportunities and
encouraged mass migrations of southern Edoid peoples,
among who were the Urhobo. The period of the
interregnum also witnessed aggressive missionary activity,
establishment of schools, institution of a system of Warrant
Chiefs and the beginnings of what later became the western
educated elite.
After 1914, the structure of the colonial
Benin Native Council provided a platform for competition
between elements of the new elite (like Iyase Agho Obaseki)
who controlled the District Council, and the Oba. The Oba
was further weakened by not being allowed to collect taxes,
appoint chiefs without British consent or control land
designated as reserved for Government activity.
Following the introduction of polls and direct taxation in
1920, the new
westernized elite in Benin became increasingly epitomized in
the years to come by social and later political groups known
at various times as the “Benin Tax-Payers Association” and “
Benin Community”. With the restoration of the indigenous
monarchy on one hand, and the simultaneous nurturing of a
colonial proxy elite on the other, therefore, two tracks in the
leadership of Benin were invoked and waxing and waning
tensions inevitably developed between them [Igbafe: Benin
under British Administration].
In spite of British gerrymandering, primordial linguistic and
cultural bonds (and differences) that had evolved over
centuries could not be wished away overnight. The
appropriate administrative structure for Nigeria was,
therefore, always a source of controversy during the colonial
era, as evidenced by the number of constitutions that were
promulgated in 1922 (Clifford), 1946 (Richards), 1951
(Macpherson), 1954, and finally 1960. Since
independence in 1960, our flirtation with numerous
constitutions in 1963, 1979, 1989, 1995 and 1999 as well as
states creation exercises and calls for a “sovereign national
conference” continues to reflect this dilemma.
For example, early British administrators toyed with various
proposals for combining groups of provinces into regions and
thus nullifying the distinction between “Northern Nigeria”
and “Southern Nigeria”. In 1912, the Editor of theAfrican
Mail, Mr. E. D. Morel, suggested that Nigeria be
consolidated into the Northern, Central, Western and Eastern
provinces [ED Morel: Nigeria, Its Peoples and Problems,
London, 1912, p201-10, 2nd Edition]. Charles L. Temple,
one time Resident of Bauchi and later Lt. Governor of
Northern Nigeria, proposed seven provinces, namely, the
Hausa States, Benue Province, Chad Territory, Western,
Central and Eastern provinces along with the Lagos colony.
The Governor-General, Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard
accepted neither of these proposals. Thus after
amalgamation, Northern and Southern Nigeria were left
intact under powerful Lt. Governors while the three previous
large provinces of Southern Nigeria, which had been run by
Provincial Commissioners, were broken down into smaller
provinces and placed under Provincial Residents. Northern
Nigeria comprised the Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, Bauchi, Zaria,
Nupe, Kontagora, Ilorin, Nassarawa, Munshi (Tiv), Muri and
Yola provinces.
The old “Central province” of Southern
Nigeria was split into the Benin and Warri provinces. The
“Eastern Province” was divided into the provinces of
Calabar, Ogoja, Onitsha and Owerri. The “Western
province” became the Abeokuta, Ondo and Oyo provinces,
joined thereafter by the new Ijebu province in 1916. Lagos
remained The Colony. But some provinces were more equal
than others, in Lugard’s eyes. Those that were “more
important” were classified as “First Class” provinces. These
were the Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, Bauchi, Zaria, Oyo, Owerri
and Abeokuta provinces. [FD Lugard:Report on the
Amalgamation of Northern and Souther Nigeria, and
administration, 1912 – 1919. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920].
The headquarters of the Southern Provinces was later moved
from Lagos to Enugu in 1929.
Even in those early days, there were already stirrings of
nationalism. In October 1923, Humphrey Omoregie Osagie,
then only a 27-year-old clerk, delivered a political lecture in
Lagos under the auspices of Herbert Macaulay and the
Nigerian National Democratic Party. The young man from
Benin would one day become a Titan in the struggle for
emancipation of his people. [A. J. Uwaifo: Omo-Osagie and
Party Politics in Benin, Department of History, University
of Ibadan, May 1985]
Meanwhile, Oba Eweka II became increasingly concerned
about the long-term implications of various administrative
proposals for new regions that would ride roughshod over
the unique history and independence of most of the peoples
of the Central Province, which later became the Benin and
Warri Provinces. Therefore, in 1926, he requested the
British to bring all the Edoid and Anioma (Western Ibo)
areas together in one region that would have a direct
reporting relationship with the center. He argued that the
people of the Benin and Warri provinces were
predominantly of one linguistic, cultural, religious,
chieftaincy and historical stock and had functioned in the
same cultural system before the British came. [File BP
44,VOL 1, The Oba of Benin. National Archives, Ibadan].
To the best of my knowledge, therefore, Oba Eweka II, in
1926, was the first, following the dissolution of the old
Central province, to conceptualize the consolidation of what
later became the Midwest region of Nigeria in 1963. It was
during his reign that the first pan-Edo association called the
Institute for Home-Benin improvement emerged in 1932. Its
mandate - according to its own documents - was to represent
the "Edo speaking people of Nigeria viz: Benin City, Ishan,
Kukuruku, Ora, Agbor, Igbanke, Sobe etc." [Uyilawa
Usuanlele: The Edo Nationality and the National Question
in Nigeria: A Historical perspective. In Osaghae and
Onwudiwe (Eds). The Management of the National
Question in Nigeria. PEFS. Ibadan 2001] In the same year,
Thomas Erukeme, Mukoro Mowoe, Omorowhovo Okoro
and others formed the Edoid Urhobo Brotherly Society in
Warri.
Unfortunately, Oba Eweka II joined his ancestors on
February 8, 1933 and did not live to see his dream come
true. It was, therefore, on the shoulders of his son, Oba
Akenzua II, crowned on April 5, 1933, after overcoming
opposition from his older sister that the spiritual and royal
leadership of the future Midwest State Movement was to fall.
[H Osadolo Edomwonyi: A Short Biography of Oba
Akenzua II. Bendel Newspapers Corporation, 1981.]
FROM 1934 - 1945
The Urhobo Brotherly Society evolved into the Urhobo
Progressive Union in 1934, and was later known as the
Urhobo Progress Union (UPU). This tightly knit
organization would prove to be a powerful ally in the fight
for the Midwest. In 1935, the Institute for Home-Benin
improvement lobbied for an Edo speaking person to
represent the Benin province in the Legislative council. Up
until then Benin was represented by a Yoruba trader called
Mr. I. T. Palmer who was living in Sapele. This wish was
eventually granted when Gaius Obaseki became the first Edo
speaking representative on the Legislative council in the
early forties (
Usuanlele op. cit.). In 1937, the first conference of
traditional Obas and rulers in the Southern Provinces of
Nigeria took place in Oyo. At that meeting a decision was
taking to rotate the venue of the meetings to the domains of
various prominent rulers. Coincidentally, the Ibo State
Union was also formed that year.
Then in 1939, what Oba Eweka II had feared came to pass.
The ten Southern Provinces (along with the Cameroon
trusteeship province) were consolidated around the Igbo and
Yoruba nationalities into two groups now called the “Eastern
provinces” based at Enugu, and the “Western Provinces”
based at Ibadan. In this new set-up, the Benin and Warri
provinces of the independent old “Central Province” were
now part of the so-called “Western group” with the River
Niger as a natural boundary. The “Anioma” or “Western
Ibo” subgroup of the Benin province, led by Asaba
indigenes, requested to be merged with the Aboh division of
the Warri province in a new Western Ibo province, but were
overruled by the British because of the advent of the Second
World War. [JIG Onyia: My role in Nationalism. 1986 JID
Printers Ltd. Asaba]. Oba Akenzua II took note of the
Asaba-led agitation. However, in the years preceding it, he
was distracted by internal problems in Benin like the Forest
reserve dispute of 1934, the abolition of District Heads in
1935, Uzebu uprising and Benin water rate agitation of 1936
– 1940 [
Igbafe, op. cit.] .
It was not long, however, before the
Richards Constitution of 1947 crystallized both groups of
provinces into the Eastern and Western “regions” of
Southern Nigeria, each with its own Regional Assembly.
The old “Northern Nigeria” remained as one large region.
Professor P.A. Igbafe has discussed much of the dynamics of
colonial rule and its impact on traditional Benin in his
outstanding book “Benin under British Administration”.
The late Jacob Egharevba also discussed tensions between
Oba Akenzua, a few of his prominent chiefs (like Iyase
Okoro-Otun) and the emerging Benin educated and
commercial elite in his seminal book “A Short History of
Benin.” Such tensions were driven by different agendas but
manifested opportunistically from time to time.
Nevertheless, these tensions - which undermined the Oba’s
stature and even threatened his throne - were temporarily
resolved after negotiated concessions following appeals from
British officials and Traditional Rulers in other jurisdictions,
like Warri.
During this era too, Oba Akenzua II, motivated by visions of
a united pan-Edoid nation, agreed to the British proposal for
transfer of large tracts of land from the Benin province to the
Warri province for “administrative convenience. Affected
tenants, who agreed to continue to pay royalty in return,
populated such lands, many of which had opened up after
1897, including places like Jesse, Ogharefe and other lands
across the Ethiope River - which are now in the Delta State
portion of the former Midwest.
In August 1942, the conference of traditional Obas and rulers
in what was now the Western Provinces of Nigeria took
place in Benin City. It is said that at that meeting, there
was an attempt to speak Yoruba as the Lingua Franca, thus
causing some irritation among delegates from the Benin and
Warri provinces. Nevertheless, the Second World War was
in progress and all efforts were focused on its successful
prosecution, so sleeping dogs were allowed to lie. The war
was interrupted only by reports that the Institute for Home-
Benin Improvement had transformed into the Edo National
Union in 1943 and that Nnamdi Azikiwe proposed eight (8)
protectorates in his “Political Blueprint for Nigeria” [RL
Sklar: Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton, 1963]. At
about this time tribal unions like the Bauchi Improvement
Association, Ibibio State Union, and the Pan-Ibo Federal
Union became known. The pro-independence national
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was
formed by Herbert Macaulay in 1944. It attracted many
young educated elite from the Benin and Warri provinces
initially. Among them were men like Mr. Anthony Enahoro,
TJ Akagbosu, Chief Gaius Obaseki, Arthur Prest, O.N.
Rewane, Begho and Edukugho. [EA Enahoro: Fugitive
Offender, London: Cassell, 1966]
AFTER WORLD WAR II
In 1945, two significant events occurred in Benin. Chief
Humphrey Omo-Osagie, already mentioned earlier in this
essay, retired from the public service and quietly returned to
Benin. He was an ex-student of King’s College Lagos where
he was a Schoolmate of Oba Akenzua. 1945 was also the
year that Oba Akenzua re-established the Aruosa Church as
the Edo National Church of God. He later wrote its
catechism and published two volumes of liturgical books as
well as a rule-book based on its constitution.
In the same year, Michael Adekunle Ajasin and Jeremiah
Obafemi Awolowo conceptualized founding the “non-
political” exclusively Yoruba vanguard cultural group called
the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of Descendants of
Oduduwa) in London. It would later be formalized in 1947
and then metamorphose into the Action Group political party
in 1950/51. [Sklar, op cit]
After the war, the momentum for independence began to
gather strongly, led by Macaulay until his untimely death in
1946 when Nnamdi Azikiwe took over the leadership of the
NCNC. By this time Obafemi Awolowo had begun staking
positions publicly and was quoted in 1947 as saying,
“Opportunity must be afforded to each group to evolve its
own peculiar political institutions.” [Awolowo: Awo – The
autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Cambridge
University Press, 1960]
Indeed, one of the controversial issues of that era was the
extent to which Edo based parties and groups should ally
themselves with parties and groups outside the Edoid region.
Oba Akenzua II was opposed to external alliances because
he saw them as a threat to Edo National aspirations. In
1947, for example, there was a conference of delegates from
the Benin and Warri provinces at the old Conference Hall in
Benin City, where fears of domination in the West were
articulated.
On the other hand, some Edo speaking politicians like
Anthony Enahoro and Gaius Obaseki, for example, became
disillusioned with Nnamdi Azikiwe and the NCNC allegedly
for Ibo leanings after Macaulay’s death. [Enahoro, op. cit.]
The Pan-Ibo Union had been one of the founding
organizations of the NCNC. However, Azikiwe later
assumed its Presidency in 1948. The West African Pilot
later quoted him in 1949 as saying “It would appear that the
God of Africa has created the Ibo nation to lead the children
of Africa from the bondage of ages….”
Meanwhile deep discomfort in Benin with the provincial
administrative changes of 1939 was heightened by proposals
in the new Richards Constitution of 1946 for the formal
creation of the Eastern, Western and Northern Regions in
Nigeria. The new constitution created a separate House of
Assembly and House of Chiefs in the Northern region.
Initially, the Eastern and Western regions were allotted a
unicameral House of Assembly each, to which were later
added a House of Chiefs for each of the Regions. But back
in Benin, Oba Akenzua II found himself once again in
dispute with elements of the “new elite” even as he kept an
eye on events at the national level.
Following the death of Iyase Okoro-Otun in 1943, efforts by
the Oba in November 1947 to abolish the title of Iyase
(“Prime Minister”) on account of his experience during the
water rate agitation were strongly opposed. Opposition was
mobilised by the new “Benin Community Tax-Payers
Association” primarily formed to pressure the Oba to confer
the title of Iyase on a literate individual. Thus he
reconsidered his position, even though supported by a group
of chiefs and prominent citizens including Omo-Osagie,
Egbe Omorogbe, Ogieva Emokpae, J. O. Edomwonyi, D.E.
Uwaifo, C.Y. Legemah etc. These chiefs and other men later
created the Edo Young People’s party [Edomwonyi, op. cit.] .
After an unsuccessful attempt to confer the title on Idehen,
then the Esogban of Benin, Oba Akenzua eventually
conferred it in April 1948 on Hon. Gaius Obaseki, son of the
late Iyase Agho Obaseki, some say under pressure from
British authorities. In the next few years to follow the Oba
was subjected to humiliations such as a decrease in his salary
and ban from conferring titles without permission [CN
Ekwuyasi: Benin Situation as it is today. Daily Times, April 26 1950, p8].
As the Iyase, Gaius Obaseki was executive Chairman of the
newly re-organized Benin Divisional Council while Oba
Akenzua II was the President. Obaseki was also the
concurrent Chairman of the Benin City Council and its
powerful Administrative Committee. In addition he was
elected the Oluwo or Leader of the influential Reformed
Ogboni Fraternity (ROF), a fact that would assume great
significance in the politics of Benin. The ROF was a
religious order said to be have been in existence since the
late 19th century but formally founded in 1914 by African
Christian clergy led by Anglican Archdeacon Ogunbiyi. It
was later introduced into Benin society from Yoruba land,
(but is different from the much older traditional Ogboni
society of Yoruba Obaship). The ROF describes itself as the
equivalent in the United States of “the Freemasons, Odd
Fellows Fraternity, The Rosicrucians, etc. [Morton,
Williams. The Yoruba Ogboni Cult in Oyo. AFRICA Vol.
xxx 1960, p 362-374].
At the Benin provincial level, there were two conferences
that year, both marked in part by growing rivalries between
two prominent sons of Benin – Chiefs Gaius Obaseki and
Humphrey Omo-Osagie. It was also in May 1948 that Bode
Thomas, an emissary of Obafemi Awolowo paid a visit to the
Benin and Warri provinces to canvass support for a new
political party with a “Yoruba orientation”. The result of
Bode Thomas’s visit was to split the hitherto united
nationalist front of young Midwest based politicians into
pro-NCNC and anti-NCNC factions. At about this time,
midwesterners barely took note of a new northern
organization called the Jamiyya Mutanen Arewa, which was
founded in May 1948. It would later evolve into the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), a political party that was
destined to play a critical role in the creation of the Midwest
region after independence.
Anyway, having accepted the Iyase situation, on October
16th, 1948, Oba Akenzua II addressed the inauguration of
what was known as the “Reformed Benin Community”,
formed by Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie in Benin:
He said, inter alia:
“The aims and ideals of this new political body seem very laudable and there is no doubt that it will help develop usefully like its counterparts, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa of the Yorubas, the Federal Union of the Ibos and so on….
In the scheme of things, all Benins should strive for a state or principality of Benin in the new Nigeria in the making. The Hausas, the Yorubas, the Ibos, and so on are on the move and the fact that this or that non-Benin political party has awarded scholarships to Binis for higher studies should not deprive us of our identity, custom, tradition, language and culture, or lull us into a false sense of security. …..
I believe Nigeria expects each of her states to do or mind its own business, though all states have one common business to perform, that is work together in order to achieve in a short time independence for a United States of Nigeria.....
Therefore, the Richards Constitution in 1950 must aim at creating more regions with full autonomy than there are at present, each with its own Governor. At least there must be a fourth region to be known as the Central or South West provinces……
I sincerely hope that the day will come when there will be a larger body to be known as the Federal Union of the Central or South West Provinces in which the Edo, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Ishan, Ora, Ivbiosakon, Sobe and so on will be principal members of the union…." [SOURCE: National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan; File BP2647. Reformed Benin Community. ]
Akenzua further advised the Reformed Benin Community to unite all the Edos, critically study the Richards Constitution, which was due for review, and make the creation of the new region the main focus of the organization. At about this time, the only other voice that was loudly heard in the wilderness of States agitation was that of Barrister Udo Udoma who was the first to conceptualize the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State.
Meanwhile, the new Iyase of Benin, Gaius Obaseki, was waxing stronger, exploiting his unique concentration of powers. Jacob Egharevba wrote: “As a result of various differences, ill-feeling grew up between the Oba and the Iyase.” Professor Igbafe was more direct:
“Like Cardinal Wolsey of Tudor England, Gaius Obaseki concentrated power in his own hands with ruthless efficiency and uncompromising vindictiveness against known opponents……..The Ogboni began to indulge in excesses. Gaius embarked on a vigorous membership drive. Those who held out were persecuted.
The result of this over-concentration of power in the hands of a single individual and the excessive exercise of that power vis-Ã -vis the Oba’s loss of prestige, stipend and power, produced an inevitable but opposite and equal reaction. There was bitterness against the Ogboni, which now began to dominate the councils and to infiltrate all walks of life in Benin. Progressive young men found the Ogboni influence a social menace and unacceptable to their way of thinking. Possibly the Iyase’s position in the council and in the Ogboni gave excessive political importance to this cult. Having struggled to place a literate young Iyase in a position of power in order to deflate the Oba’s palace autocracy, the people found that the Ogboni cult was now too powerful and sinister for their comfort.” [Igbafe: op. cit.]
At the Warri and Benin provincial conferences of 1949, all Edo-speaking people (including Urhobo) supported calls for a Midwest State [Files BP/2328, BP/2678/1, BP/742; WP/569/1 National Archives, Ibadan]. During this period opinion among leaders from Asaba division was predominantly in support of consolidation with the Eastern region or creation of a western Igbo province within the Western region. Asaba, western Ijaw, and an Itsekiri faction all opposed creation of the Midwest. When Benin and Warri delegates in favor of creation of the Midwest region attempted to raise the issue at the Western regional conference on Constitutional reform that year, they were prevented from doing so. Therefore, with Oba Akenzua in the lead, they walked out. Meanwhile both Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe at this stage were expressing preference for a Three-States based Nigeria, a position they elucidated at the All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference in Ibadan in January 1950, preparatory to the take-off of the MacPherson Constitution.
Back in Benin, the fear and resentment of the Ogboni was amplified the suspicion that it was some sort of mechanism for the Yoruba infiltration and control of Benin society [Abiodun Aloba: It is a choice between Ogboni and Benin. Daily Times, October 1st, 1951, p8]. This later became the template for a popular uprising. Many who had tormented Oba Akenzua in the difficult days of the 1930s and early forties became royalist. The “Reformed Benin Community” noted above, later evolved, first to “Otu-Adolo” and then to “Otu-Edo” on March 15th, 1950, specifically, according to J. Osadolo Edomwonyi, to “counter the excesses of the ill-motivated activities of the so-called Taxpayers Association cum Ogboni.” [Edomwonyi, op. cit] After a crack-down by Obaseki against local demonstrations, a delegation of leaders led by E. O. Imafidon was sent to Lagos to invite Humphrey Omo-Osagie back to Benin from a meeting in Lagos, to lead the Otu-Edo. The new party was dedicated to the “development of Benin and the unification of all Edo-speaking peoples of Nigeria.” In its constitution it also said it would promote “a sense of nationalism among the people of Benin” and combat threats to “the structures of our laws and custom” and “national unity.” [Orobosa Oronsaye: Cultural Organisation and Political Development – The case of the Otu-Edo. University of Ibadan, Department of History, June 1977.]
It was in this context that the Otu-Edo party was formed in a crisis atmosphere, to support the Oba in his fight against the taxpayers association under Iyase Gaius Obaseki at the local level while mobilizing support for the Midwest State Movement at the provincial level. [Otu-Edo Union, File No. 1170/1 National Archives, Ibadan] Although, there were some initial problems with key NCNC leaders like Ernest Ikoli, Mbonu Ojike and Nnamdi Azikiwe, some of whom were suspected of being members of the ROF in Lagos, Otu-Edo later entered into an alliance with the NCNC at the national level. Meanwhile, at the local level in Benin, according to Professor Igbafe:
“……..the Ogboni allied with the Action Group founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo out of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in Yorubaland…”
How did all this play out?
After Otu-Edo was created, another political party, called the Benin Action Group was created in Benin in March 1951, in response to the activities of Bode Thomas mentioned earlier. They were both opposed to Ogbonism in Benin politics, as crystallized, in their opinion, by the Benin Community Taxpayers Association. Indeed both parties overlapped and shared membership.
In the weeks preceding the formal launching of the united “Action Group” at Owo from April 28 – 30, 1951, Anthony Enahoro had organized a meeting of Benin and Warri leaders of thought in Sapele, ostensibly to discuss Midwestern solidarity. People like Gaius Obaseki, Arthur Prest, Festus Edah (Okotie-Eboh), Okorodudu, S. O. Ighodaro etc. were present. At the meeting, most participants expressed sentiments against the creation of a separate midwestern region. However, two dissenters, Chike Ekwuyasi and E. O. Imafidon who were present, rushed back to Benin to alert Omo-Osagie who then called a rally of his own and initiated counter-measures [Oronsaye, op. cit.; Uwaifo, op. cit].
On April 28, delegates from Benin and Warri provinces attended the main Action Group conference at Owo, at which merger of the Midwestern and Western components was accomplished. Gauis Obaseki emerged as the Vice President for Benin Province, S.O. Ighodaro, as Treasurer, Anthony Enahoro as Assistant Secretary, while Arthur Prest and W. E. Mowarin emerged as Vice Presidents from the Warri province. However, Benin Action Group delegates, like D.N. Oronsaye, C. N. Ekwuyasi, S. O. Ighodaro, and others, who were not members of the Reformed Ogboni Fraternity, opposed Gaius Obaseki’s election at Owo. When they returned, the Benin Action Group dissociated themselves from Chief Awolowo’s Action group and later allied themselves with H Omo-Osagie’s Otu-Edo party in what was known as Otu-Edo/Benin Action Group Grand Alliance. Iyase Obaseki, now Vice President for the Awolowo Action group, moved immediately, some say ruthlessly, to consolidate his hold on Benin division [Oronsaye. Op. cit.].
The stage was set, therefore, for a bitterly fought council election, which took place in December 1951. The period preceding it was associated with waves of violence, including arson and murder, in an uprising against the Awolowo Action Group/Benin Taxpayers Association/Ogboni known locally as “Airen Egbe Ason”, meaning “people do not recognize each other at night”. Beginning in July, but with its high point on September 6th, it was allegedly triggered by actions of two members of the “Ogboni Action group”, namely Iyare and Obazee, at Evbowe in Isi district. [File 1818/6/B National Archives, Ibadan] Farmers who opposed the Ogboni were allegedly mobilized and concentrated at Eguaholor from where they proceeded to burn down the houses of leaders of the Ogboni in villages all over Isi district. The epidemic breakdown of law and order necessitated massive mobilization of Policemen to many parts of rural Benin province [File B.D. 1818/7. Benin Situation Report. National Archives, Ibadan]. Many were detained, subsequently charged to court, fined and even jailed. GCM Onyiuke, Charles Idigbe, and Mr. S. O. Ighodaro, then the Secretary of the Benin Action group, comprised the legal team hired by Otu-Edo to defend its members.
Nevertheless, after the mayhem, with the Ogboni infrastructure broken in the rural areas, Otu-Edo, under Humphrey Omo-Osagie, with the Oba as its patron, came to power in Benin in 1952 - while at the regional level, the Awolowo Action Group dominated the legislature in Ibadan. The Macpherson Constitution replaced the Richards Constitution in 1952. It created a central legislature that was called the House of Representatives and initially led to false hopes that a quick mechanism for States Creation would be established. Meanwhile, Oba Akenzua had to preside over the residual bitterness that accompanied the recruitment drive for ROF, followed by the uprising of 1951 in Benin division. It tore families and communities apart. However, with no justification intended for the violence, had Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie not come to power that year to align the “new elite” with the “traditional leadership”, the subsequent unified role of Benin as the heartland of the agitation for the creation of the Midwest may never have seen the light.
When the Western House of Assembly opened in January 1952, 21 out of 24 Midwesterners were allied with the NCNC while three – S.O. Ighodaro, Arthur Prest, and Anthony Enahoro - were allied with the Action Group. One immediate source of irritation was the government’s official pamphlet, which insensitively described the Parliamentary Mace with four ceremonial swords as representing the authority of Yoruba Chiefs. To aggravate matters, when the unicameral Western House of Assembly was formally declared open by then Lt. Governor Sir Hugo Marshall, the Alake of Abeokuta, rose to speak immediately after Sir Marshall and said:
“On my right sits the Oni of Ife; On my left, the Leader of our Government, Obafemi Awolowo. The Voice of the West is complete.” [Hansard of Western House of Assembly: January 7, 1952]
In other words, as the delegates from Benin and Delta saw it, the “voice of the West” did not include those of the people of Benin and Delta provinces. To compound matters, Benin and Delta delegates later complained too about derogatory epithets that had allegedly been hurled at them, such as “KoboKobo”, used to refer to persons (or barbarians) whose diction cannot be understood. [File BP/2328/1 National Archives, Ibadan]
From this point on, the Oba of Benin, Akenzua II, supported by the Benin and Warri (Delta) legislative delegation, began openly touring Benin and other Divisions of Benin province as well as the Delta province to campaign for the Midwest (Central) region. According to Professor Michael Crowder:
“In the Western region, as a reaction against the allegedly Yoruba-dominated Action group, the Mid-West State movement was started, supported largely by non-Yoruba-speaking peoples and in particular the people of the old Benin Empire.” [M Crowder: The Story of Nigeria. 3rd Edition, 1972. Faber]
Indeed, at the very next Benin Provincial Conference at Ogwashi-Uku in June 1952, attended by pro-Midwesterners like JO Odigie of Ishan, Chike Ekwuyasi of Benin and Dennis Osadebay of Asaba, separatist sentiments were strongly expressed, resulting in the creation of the “Central State Congress”. [File BP/2328/1 National Archives, Ibadan] One of the criticisms of the Western region government was the alleged decision to spend 225,000 pounds in Awolowo’s home province of Ijebu with a population of 383,000, as compared with 169,000 pounds in the Benin province with a population of 624,000. Subsequently, a subgroup known as the Committee of the Midwest Organization emerged under R.O. Odita.
Before the end of 1952 another significant event occurred. It was the decision of the Action Group government based in Ibadan to restore the title of the ‘Olu of Itsekiri’ to ‘Olu of Warri’ as it had been known in previous centuries. Non-Itsekiris in Warri Province reacted violently, concerned that there was an implication of suzerainty over the whole province. Thus a compromise was reached. In exchange for acceptance of the designation of the Olu as ‘Olu of Warri’, the province was renamed ‘Delta province’. [personal papers, Alfred O. Rewane] In spite of this compromise, the experience soured the relationship between many Urhobo leaders of thought and the Action group leadership, which they felt, had been beholden to a powerful Itsekiri lobby. It served to drive Urhobos, already so inclined, further into the warm embrace of the Midwest Separatist Movement.
Back in Benin, another one of the many clashes between H. Omo-Osagie and Gaius Obaseki was playing out. In 1953, Otu-Edo got Iyase Obaseki deposed as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Benin Divisional Council allegedly for not attending meetings. His Orderly and Police escorts were withdrawn and monthly salaries stopped [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. However, the Oba did not cooperate in the attempt to strip him of his title as Iyase, allegedly for not performing the rites of the office. Thus Obaseki retained his title as Iyase – although he never really performed the formal traditional ceremonies of acceptance of the title in the first place. Nevertheless, colonial authorities removed the Resident in Benin province, Mr. H. Butcher for his role in during and after the controversial Iyase affair of 1948.
In July/August 1953, Councilor J. Osadolo Edomwonyi moved a motion in the Benin Divisional Council praying the Constitutional Conference in London to include on its agenda, the creation of a separate region for the Benin and Delta provinces [Edomwonyi, Op. Cit.]. However, overshadowed by a bitter fight between Obafemi Awolowo of the Western region and Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Eastern region over excision of Lagos on one hand and Southern Cameroons on the other, creation of new States was overruled at the London Constitutional conference [Report of the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, held in London, July-August, 1953 Cmnd. 8934, (London: H.M.S.O., 1953, p4)]. When he returned from London, Chief Omo-Osagie briefed Oba Akenzua II, who then made arrangements to host a conference of traditional and political leaders of the Benin and Delta provinces on September 18, 1953 in Benin City. Anthony Enahoro, S. O. Ighodaro, Arthur Prest and the Olu of Warri boycotted this well attended meeting. In his address, Oba Akenzua II said, among other things that Midwesterners were seeking freedom, “not only from the white man, but also from foreign african nations…” He went on to state that,
“Benin-Delta was a sovereign nation before the occupation of the country by the British.” Akenzua also said, “The divide and rule policy of the British Government had done much harm to the national solidarity of Benin-Delta Province in the past but as God now wants things to be what they were before the advent of the British Government, that is, the Yoruba State for the Yorubas and Benin-Delta State for the “BENDELITES”, that is, the inhabitants of the Benin-Delta Province, steps should now be taken without further delay or fear to move the British Government to repair the damage they have done by restoring the national status of Benin-Delta Province before they transfer power back to the Nigerians from whom they have taken it.”
Mr. JIG Onyia of Asaba then moved a motion, which said inter-alia:
“Be it resolved, and it is hereby resolved that:
1. We (the peoples of Benin-Delta Province) in a conference holding at Benin City this 18th day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty three, demand as of right an immediate creation of a separate State for the peoples of Benin-Delta Province…….” [Edomwonyi, Op. Cit.]
Spurred on by stronger and stronger perceptions of discrimination in the West, exemplified by matters such as the state ment of Alake of Egbaland in 1952, Adegoke Adelabu’s emergence over Osadebay as NCNC leader of Opposition in the West, threats of Western regional control of Midwestern forests, etc. H Omo-Osagie urged the assembly to create a “party which will serve as the Vanguard in the battle for the Midwest.” The envisioned party was to be independent of parties based in other regions. After overruling an alternative concept put forward by JIG Onyia of Asaba, that the organization so created should be a “movement” rather than a “political party”, the Benin Delta Political Party (BDPP) was created. It was to function under the patronage of a President General (Oba Akenzua II) and six Vice Presidents (Ogirrua of Irrua, Emeni of Obiaruku, Ovie of Ughelli, Momodu of Agbede, Ovie of Effurun and Ogenieni of Uzairue). Members of the Executive Committee were D.E. Odiase, T.O. Elaiho, G. Brass Ometan, J. W. Amu, J. D. Ifode, J. Igben, Martins Adebayo, John Uzo, H. O. Uwaifo and Barrister Gabriel Edward Longe. Chief Oweh later replaced JD Ifode. Other BDPP stalwarts included Onogie Enosegbe II of Ewohimi, E. A. Lamai of Fugar and Martins Adebayo of Akoko-Edo. [File Ben Prof 2/BP/3022, National Archives, Ibadan]
Oba Akenzua II subsequently notified the Western House of Chiefs of this development, quipping, “I think that the Benin Delta State can succeed very well without being tied to the apron strings of the Yoruba State.” He also said “The fact is the Benin/Delta People’s Party will not allow the Benin/Delta State to be annexed to the Yoruba State whether the North and the East are broken into small States or not.” [Western House of Chiefs Debates, Oct. 20, 1953] Then he proceeded to lead a series of tours all over the Midwest to campaign for the Midwestern region. Such tours were undertaken in December 1953, February and May 1954. The BDPP hinged its success on the prestige of various traditional rulers, inspite of undercurrents of tension with some western Ibo, specifically Asaba leaders like F. Utomi and G Onyia, who issued public statements after the Western Igboid Conference of December 1953, that Asaba people should not attend BDPP meetings. In his memoirs, Dennis Osadebay says “they feared that the creation of the region would mean the resuscitation of the old Benin Kingdom and it’s alleged oppressive rule and domination of minorities.” [DC Osadebay: Building a Nation: An Autobiography. MacMillan, 1978.]
In 1954, Obafemi Awolowo became Premier of the Western region under the 1954 Constitution that created the Federation of Nigeria. At the same time Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh of Warri, representing the NCNC, became the Regional Minister of Labour and Welfare. Dennis Osadebay emerged as NCNC Opposition leader in the West, while V.I. Amadasun became NCNC Chief Whip. Meanwhile the BDPP relied increasingly on the local NCNC operational infrastructure, even while foreswearing any party links in public. As time went on, therefore, pressure grew from within the BDPP to formally ally the party with the NCNC – which the Oba was opposed to. Meanwhile there were unconfirmed rumors at the end of 1954 that the Oba had reached a secret deal with Chief Awolowo. [Michael Vickers, Ethnicity and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria, p93] Concerned about these rumours, Chief Omo-Osagie decided to ignore the General Secretary of Otu-Edo, Mr. J. Osadolo Edomwonyi, who had close links to the Palace, and unilaterally nominate Mr. Eric Imafidon to contest the All-Nigerian Parliamentary elections. Both Omo-Osagie and Imafidon defeated Edomwonyi’s “Oba of Benin BDPP faction” candidates. [Uwaifo, Op. Cit.; Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]
The Action Group had in the meantime conceptualized a plan to seize political control of Benin by co-opting the Oba and destroying Chief H Omo-Osagie.
According to testimony from Dr. Obas. J. Ebohon,
“My father was the personal driver of Chief Omo-Osagie through out his political career and what both himself and B2 went through before, during, and after the creation of Mid-West is unimaginable and sometimes better than some of 007 epic films. My father once told me that the journeys to and from the Western House of Assembly in Ibadan was the type of journeys one makes to and from the battle field. Firstly, they never exceeded four people and they travelled by Bedford Lorry instead of a car to which his status demanded. The reason for this was security as his life was threatened openly by those enraged by his demands for Mid-West State. He said on approaching Ore, they would disembark and B2 would come out of the comfortable second row and climb into the back of the Bedford lorry and be covered with trampoline and that is where he would remain through the numerous roadblocks put out to hunt him down and, that is how he would remain until they arrive Ibadan. Sometimes, for the need to confuse his detractors, he would be hidden in lorries carrying plantain to Ibadan and guess where he would be sitting - buried among the plantain and that is how he remains until the outskirts of Ibadan and be transferred into the Bedford lorry again. On numerous occasions they escaped death with the skin of his teeth. My father indicated that when they are travelling, it usually was like preparing for a funeral at B2's house and those of his entourage and the worst is expected and, when they return unharmed, it was jubilation.” (Source: OJ Ebohon. Edo-Nation Egroup, July 5, 2002. RE: [Edo-Nation] The Last Edo Political Titan: Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie)
Under these circumstances, on March 8th, 1955, Obafemi Awolowo invited Oba Akenzua II for a meeting in Ibadan. According to the minutes of the meeting, Chief Awolowo told Oba Akenzua II to disengage himself from politics before it becomes a disadvantage. Awolowo told him that he had planned to preserve the position of traditional rulers as an "important part of the social and spiritual life of the people" outside the political arena. In response, Oba Akenzua II politely but firmly drew a distinction between politics and his activities with the Midwest State movement. He went further to query why the Ooni of Ife and the Alake of Abeokuta were open supporters and contributors to the Action Group but were not being similarly advised. Awolowo reacted by promising to give other Obas similar advice, but also told Oba Akenzua II to go back to Benin and seriously reflect over his comments. [National Archives, Ibadan; File B.P.215 Correspondence with the Oba of Benin.]
This meeting between Oba Akenzua and Chief Awolowo was to presage a complex series of intrigues that would unfold in the next few months. Just as Chief H Omo-Osagie was to leave for Lagos in March 1955 to take up a new position as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, he was involved in a factional split with a sub-faction of the Edomwonyi group led by A.G. Bazuaye within the Otu-Edo [Otu-Edo Secretariat: Confusion in the Otu Edo. March 4, 1955]. This was coming to a head just as the mandate of the Benin Native Authority Council was expiring. The Action Group Government in Ibadan refused to renew the mandate of the council, preferring instead to appoint a provisional caretaker council. This caretaker committee was under the chairmanship of the Oba, but consisted of a mixture of the pro-Action Group Bazuaye faction of Otu-Edo and elements of Iyase Gaius Obaseki’s pro-Action Group Benin Tax Payers Association, pending new elections. The new provisional council included well-known Action Groupers like S.Y. Eke and V.O.E. Osula [Benin Native Authority Files 730/4 (April 2, 1955) and 730/5 (May5, 1955)]. It increased the salary of the Oba in a move that appeared to signal a rapprochement between Oba Akenzua and Iyase Gauis Obaseki. It was hoped that the Oba would cooperate with an alliance of the Bazuaye and Obaseki groups to oust Omo-Osagie from power. But the Oba wanted some kind of public indication that the Action Group would stop being ambivalent or even hostile toward the creation of the Midwest.
Therefore, on June 14th, 1955, a legislator, MS Sowole, moved a motion, seconded by JG Ako, a minister of state, which was carried in the Western House of Assembly titled “Creation of a Separate State for Benin and Delta Provinces.” Chief Awolowo’s curious reaction to this development on the floor of the House was to announce that “the Government adopts no official attitude whatsoever” towards the Sowole motion [Western House of Assembly Debates, 14 June, 1955].
According to Professor Michael Crowder, at this stage, the Action Group:
“…..gave its blessing to this movement, partly because it was beginning to find the Mid-West anelectoral and economic liability and partly because it realized that if it were to champion the creation of new states in the Eastern and Northern Regions it could hardly object to the creation of one in the Western region itself.”
The problem, though, was that the Action group was never trusted by core Midwest Protagonists, who saw opportunism and duplicity in its behavior. Dennis Osadebay, for example, was of the opinion that the Sowole motion was little more than a vote catching gimmick to secure victory at the 1955 and 1956 general elections [Osadebay, Op. Cit.]. In time to come his suspicions would be confirmed when, after independence, Chief Awolowo openly said that the Sowole motion was not binding on the Western region.
It was in this situation that local government elections took place in Benin in September 1955. Once again, Chief Omo-Osagie and the Otu-Edo were victorious [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. A few weeks later, on October 25th, 1955 Oba Akenzua was appointed Minister without portfolio in Awolowo’s government at Ibadan – an announcement that practically destroyed the BDPP. The Oba explained that henceforth he would use his membership of the Action group Government of the Western region to push for the creation of the Midwest. In response, members of Otu-Edo in Benin staged a mock funeral of the Oba right in front of his Palace.
Meanwhile, according to Michael Vickers, in December 1955, western Ibo leaders, not unmindful of developments in Benin, but also confident in their trained manpower advantage over others, decided that a future Midwest would best serve their interests, rather than either the West or East. Thus they began renegotiating the terms of renewed cooperation with the now moribund BDPP. [Vickers: Ethnicity and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria. Worldview Publishing, 2000. p121] Thus, inspite of his stature as the earliest and most consistently committed advocate of the Midwest cause, H. Omo-Osagie would later concede the leadership of the Midwest State Movement to Dennis Osadebay, also known as the “Gentleman Leader of the Opposition” in exchange for support.
In January 1956, the Oba removed himself as a Patron of Otu-Edo, and stopped making public demands for the creation of the Midwest, hoping to achieve it, nonetheless, by some kind of internal understanding with Chief Awolowo’s government. The Oba’s high stakes moves throughout 1955 caused a lot of mistrust within Otu-Edo as well as pro-Midwest sympathizers in other parties. But Oba Akenzua remained convinced that his presence in the government was the tactical thing to do in the circumstances. He would give Chief Awolowo time to fulfill his promise. In February, he hosted the Queen at the Benin Airport and made a point of emphasizing the uniqueness of the grand Benin-Delta reception. Tragically, Iyase Gaius Obaseki died in April and was mourned throughout the region as a man of great stature. [Egharevba, Op. Cit.]
Another development in the Western Regional Assembly that created consternation in the Benin and Delta provinces was the attempt in 1956 to enforce Yoruba as a language medium in all schools throughout ALL the provinces. The British Lt. Governor, Sir John Rankine, vetoed compulsory implementation in the Benin and Delta provinces, explaining that it was a time–bomb. It is not clear what role Oba Akenzua II played in securing this veto. [personal communication, D. A. Omoigui]
On May 5, 1956, the Midwest State Movement (MSM) was inaugurated from the ashes of the BDPP. Its patron was the Obi of Agbor. Members of the Executive Committee were Dennis Osadebay (Leader), Chief H. Omo-Osagie (Deputy Leader), J. E. Otobo (Secretary), G.E. Odiase, O. Oweh, F. Oputa-Otutu and M.A. Kubeinje. Its legal advisers were A. Atake, M. Edewor, W. Egbe, GE Longe, and JM Udochi. [JA Brand. The Midwest State Movement in Nigerian Politics. Political Studies, Vol. XIII, 3 (1965), p351] In preparation for the September 1956 London Constitutional Conference, the MSM embarked on fund raising drives and political tours through the Delta and Benin provinces [Vickers, Op. Cit.]. It also began developing detailed arguments to justify the creation of a new region. Such arguments included the proposed region’s distinct way of life, various examples of discrimination including allocation of funds to various line items in the budget. The proposed region’s economic viability was also studied, taking note of its agricultural base, Rubber, Timber, Palm oil, brown coal, water resources, ports and its capacity to create secondary industries from the African Timber and Plywood Factory in Sapele. The conference was, however, later deferred until 1957.
Meanwhile on May 26, during Western parliamentary regional elections in Benin, Otu-Edo secured victory once again. Notably, G.I. Oviasu of Otu-Edo/NCNC defeated S.O. Ighodaro of the Action Group and the Oba’s second son, Felix Akenzua, lost to VI Amadasun. One irritant during this election was the complaint that many students from the Benin and Delta provinces at the University College Ibadan were so mistrusted by Action group operatives on campus that their names were surreptitiously removed from voters’ registration lists in Ibadan.
LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF 1957
During the 1957 London Constitutional Conference, the MSM declared that it would be willing to accept a plebiscite in the Benin-Delta area. However, efforts by the MSM to insist that the creation of states be discussed before self-government were outflanked as the NCNC and AG resisted any effort to create new states in their own regions [Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London, May and June 1957. Cmnd. 207. London: HMSO, 1957]. The AG, for example, accused the NCNC of stalling about the proposed COR State because of the possibility of discovery of Oil, even as it was busy proposing regions elsewhere. The NPC was also uninterested in the creation of new regions in the North. All three parties did not want any delays in independence merely on account of creation of new states for minorities.
Eventually, Chief Awolowo, while opposing all State requests except those of the Midwest, COR and Middle Belt, which he said should be created simultaneously, got his rivals in the NCNC and Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) to accept certain fundamental principles which would guide creation of new regions and which would be enshrined in the proposed new constitution. These requirements included a two-thirds majority consent of the legislature of the concerned state from which the new state was to be created, as well as the federal parliament; that ethnic groups should not be split; that ethnic groups that chose not to separate could stay with the original state; and that both the proposed new state and the residual state from which it was created should meet tests of viability.
For the Midwest in particular, Anthony Enahoro proposed an idea patterned after the Ministry of Welsh Affairs that had been created in 1951 in the United Kingdom by the Conservative government. This concept meant that rather than a new Midwest region, the Midwest would be managed under a “Ministry of Midwest Affairs” concurrently under his supervision as the Western region Minister for Home Affairs. Chief Awolowo accepted this concept.
By the time the conference came to an end, delegates from the three major ethnic groups had agreed that in addition to tough legislative requirements at federal and regional levels, a plebiscite should be conducted in the area of any proposed new state to determine if 60% of registered voters in the area wanted a new state [Joint Proposals by the NPC, NCNC and Action Group Delegations: The creation of New States. Statement submitted to the Nigerian Constitutional Conference, London, June 1957.]. As a consolation prize, a Commission of Inquiry was recommended to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities and consider what safeguards should be included in the new constitution, with the proviso that creation of states only be considered as a last resort. The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, appointed this commission in September 1957. It later came to be known as the Willink Commission. Its members were Henry Willink, Gordon Hadow, Phillip Mason and J.B. Shearer. It arrived in Nigeria on November 23rd, 1957 and held public sittings and private meetings from December 8th to 23rd at Benin and Warri. Following an extensive schedule of visits all over the country, it left for the UK on April 12th, 1958 and eventually submitted its report on July 30th, 1958. [Cmnd. 505. London: HMSO, 1958]
Before settling down to prepare for the Willink Commission visit, reaction to the outcome of the London Conference among members of the MSM was extremely negative. Chief Omo-Osagie, for example, said,
“The people of the Midwest would willingly submit to the use of nuclear weapons, devastating bombs or machine guns to annihilate them, rather than remain in a self governing West.” [West African Pilot. July 14, 1957]
TESTIMONY AT THE WILLINK COMMISSION
It has been said that the Midwest State Movement flew the two expatriate counsels that led the testimony of the pro-Midwest witnesses at the Willink Commission, into the country. In point of fact Chief Omo-Osagie paid for their round trip fares and expenses out of his own pocket. Money was not forthcoming from the NCNC. The more senior of the pair was George G. Baker.
Three major sets of opinion were canvassed. The Midwest State movement was only interested in the creation of the Midwest (meaning Benin and Warri provinces en bloc) – to which it wanted the Edo-speaking Sobe and Ijagba areas of Ondo province appended. The Action Group, represented by its lawyer, Fani Kayode, conceded that the Midwest might, as a last resort, be allowed to go (after all the legislative hurdles) but that Warri division and Akoko-Edo should join Ondo province, while the western Ibo should join the Eastern region and the western Ijaw should join eastern Ijaw. He even went further to suggest that Ishan division should be excluded from the “residual Midwest” for no other reason than because Ishan had a significant number of Action Group supporters. The government of the Western region, represented by Rotimi Williams, differed slightly from Fani-Kayode, by accepting that Afemai and Ishan divisions could join the proposed “residual Midwest”, implying the Benin and Urhobo divisions, if they wished. [Willink Commission report. Cmnd. 505. London: HMSO, 1958]
The position of the MSM was based on fear of colonization by the Yoruba. Detailed testimony was heard from a broad range of witnesses, including Chiefs Ezomo, Oliha, Ineh and Osula. Other witnesses included the Chairmen of the Iyekovia, Uhunmwode and Benin City councils, namely Messrs Adonrin, Atohengbe and Ogbebor. Edo women made a submission through Madam Eweka. Complaints included lack of rubber markets and processing facilities, excessive local taxation, including “head taxes” which would then be remitted to Ibadan, poor infrastructure, and discrimination in the award of scholarships and opportunities for Edo women traders at Ibadan. More recently, Mr. Isaac Asemota recalled that, “While Benin- City stayed in the dark with no electricity, running water, good roads, separate and unequal schools and grossly inadequate health clinics, there in Ibadan, Edo tax monies were being squandered in the construction of Cocoa House, Mapo Hall and Commercial Broadcasting Service Radio Station whose frequency we couldn’t even pick up in Benin-City. The best we could hope for was Redifussion radio which had a very low frequency and could not be heard more than two miles away from the broadcasting booth. “ (Isaac Asemota: “The last Edo Political Titan: Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie” unpublished manuscript, Edo-Nation Egroup, July 2, 2002.)
The most powerful and emotional testimony from Benin came from Chief H Omo-Osagie. He lamented the insidious cultural role of Ifa divination and Ogboni activities in inserting Yoruba values and ways into Benin society. He explained that Ifa divination required knowledge of Yoruba, while the Yoruba derived Ogboni society, was, according to him, “more dangerous than freemasonry.” In fact he openly stated that after independence, laws would likely be passed, making membership of the ROF compulsory. He went on to criticize the Western region Chiefs Law No. 20 of 1957 which was being used with effect to intimidate traditional rulers and influence the selection of chiefs and Dukes inside the Midwest. The Chief also went into additional detail about perceptions of Yoruba domination of the Police, government boards, the public service, and the use of scholarships as a tool for punishing separatist divisions. The Benin division, for example, had not, under the period of review, received any scholarships, while the Ijebu province (home to Chief Awolowo) had secured 17 such awards. Another complaint was that Rubber was being developed in the Ijebu province when investment in the promised Ikpoba Rubber processing factory for already established rubber plantations of the Midwest was being help up. A similar shenanigan affected the Koko port. He went on to use examples of the decision by the Action Group government to dissolve the Benin Divisional Council in 1955 as an example of arbitrary misuse of power. In conclusion, Chief Omo-Osagie opposed the new “Welsh-type” arrangement implemented by the Action Group through the establishment of the “Ministry of Midwest Affairs” and the Midwest Advisory Council, and demanded either the creation of a Midwest region or a return to a unitary government at the center with provinces at the periphery.
Supporting testimony from the Ishan division, where the Action Group had deposed the Onogies of Idoa and Ubiaja was also heard from G. Ebea, A. Ibhazo, Prince Shaka Momodu, and His Royal Highness, Enosegbe II, Enogie of Ewohimi. Similarly, the Commission heard from the Oba of Agbede who bluntly stated that the Oba of Benin, and not any of the Yoruba Obas, was his Oba. On their part, Messrs Utomi, Onyia and Odiakosa provided the views of the Asaba division. Interestingly, while scholarship complaints were commonplace in the Benin division, the Asaba division was doing very well with scholarships under the guidance of its representative, Dennis Osadebay, who was then the Chairman of the Regional Scholarships Board. In Warri, there was a split among the Itsekiri. While Chiefs Arthur Prest and Festus Okotie-Eboh were in support, at this stage, of creation of a Midwest region, O.N. Rewane and the Olu of Warri were against it.
In response to testimony of pro-Midwest witnesses, a shadowy organization called the “Anti-Midwest State Movement” was put forward by the Action Group. It asserted that Edos had more to fear from Igbo than Yoruba domination, and that creation of a Midwest region would expose Edos to Igbo domination.
Among its observations, the commission noted that actual expenditure on road development in the Midwest area up to March 31, 1957, was only 15% of the estimates, compared with 50% in the Yoruba West. It also made the following observation:
“What is feared is a permanent Action Group majority in the Western House of Assembly. The Action Group drawing its inspiration from a Yoruba society, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa expressing itself….through the Ogboni Fraternity, controlling Boards, Corporations and Commissions, eventually even the Magistracy and Judiciary, aiming at the obliteration of all that is not Yoruba. That is what is meant by Yoruba domination.”
But in its recommendations, the Willink Commission advised that short of a new state, the “Midwest area” for which the Ministry of Midwest Affairs of the Western region was being established be reduced to a “Council for Edo Affairs” with responsibility for development, welfare and culture preservation, covering the Edo-speaking divisions of Benin, Urhobo, Afenmai and Ishan. In addition to a similarly proposed “Calabar Council” in Eastern Nigeria, the commission felt that “these two are the areas in which it seems to us, there is the strongest and most united local sentiment and the most clearly distinguishable culture.” (see Willink Report, Chapter 14, Section 4, Item 36, page 97.)
In reaction, the MSM rejected the Willink report, insisted on creation of the Midwest region, but left open the possibility of a “Provincial Commissioner for Benin and Delta provinces” at the federal level – an option the Action Group rejected outright.
1958 – 1960
While the Constitutional Conference and Willink Commission were finalizing their activities, the Western region passed what was known as “amendment No. 4” to the local government law of 1957, which gave it new powers by which it could manipulate the control of local councils. The combination of the local government and chieftaincy laws, control of customary courts and heavy handed use of tax assessments was then exploited in an aggressive drive by the Action Group to take control of the Benin and Delta provinces [Sklar - Benin: A Study in the Mechanics of Chieftaincy Control. P238-42, In: Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties.].
During the Lancaster House conference in London which took place in September and October 1958, the concept of a minority area inclusive of Benin and Delta provinces, except Warri division and Akoko-Edo district was discussed and vaguely agreed to, pending further consultation, without plans for a Special Ijaw Area Board. [Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference Held in London, September and October 1958, Cmnd. 569, London: HMSO, 1958]
In the meantime, the rising political profile of key Midwesterners who would come to play critical roles in the creation of the Midwest was unmistakable. A national government was formed based on the 1957 constitution, in preparation for independence. In this government Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh of Warri emerged as the Minister for Labor and Welfare (NCNC), a position which gave him direct access to northern leaders with whom he consolidated strong personal relationships which would be used by the Midwest movement with devastating effect after independence. The Action Group was represented by Chief SL Akintola (Communications and Aviation) and Mr. Ayo Rosiji (Health). Other Midwesterners like H. Omo-Osagie, James Otobo, V. I. Amadasun, Oputa-Otutu, Shaka Momodu, FH Utomi and others also became more prominent in party and legislative affairs at regional and national levels. It was in May 1958 that initial talks to enter into a post-independence government coalition were held between the NCNC and the NPC [Enahoro, Fugitive Offender, Op. Cit.].
Back in Benin, the battle to undermine Chief Omo-Osagie’s power base was continuing – on all fronts. Local government elections took place in Benin on May 17th, 1958 [Oronsaye, Op. Cit.]. The manipulation of post-election council nominations made it possible for the Action group to dominate the council although the party did not win the elections. On November 25th, Action group stalwart S. Y. Eke, moved a motion to ban Owegbe “juju” (also known as Isigidi, Aimuekpensulele or Iselogha) from the Benin division. The motion was carried and confirmed on March 19th, 1959 by an order of the Western region Governor-in-Council – with the support of Oba Akenzua II [West Regional Gazette, No. 14 of 19 March, 1959]. The Oba, who was then a Minister in the government, had commented in a letter on January 23rd, 1959, that Owegbe was an imported juju and that its existence in Benin was a threat to peace. Chief Omo-Osagie demanded a formal judicial inquiry, saying the ban was politically motivated, and explained that that there was no “juju” or “cult” as such, but that there was indeed an “Owegbe society” which was the “youth wing” of the Otu-Edo party. The existence of youth wings was by no means a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The Zikist National Vanguard and Awo National Brigade were examples, according to the Chief, who also directed attention to the violations of fundamental human rights and freedom of association which the ban implied [Debates of the Western House of Assembly, May 27, 1959; col. 863].
When however, Chief Omo-Osagie asserted that the Oba would testify that there was no such thing as “Owegbe juju” known in the Benin division, the Oba, in a letter dated July 22nd, 1959 stated that there was such a “juju” which, in his opinion at that time, as a Minister in the Action group government, was dangerous. In what seemed to reflect the underlying political fear, the Oba said the danger was not with claims of powers to kill or save but in the ability of intelligent citizens based in Benin, having convinced less sophisticated rural based folk to take oaths, could then by order, cause disturbances anytime they wished – a veiled reference to the disturbances of 1951. Using this cover, the western region government moved to emasculate the Owegbe society, which was actually originally created to provide sanctuary for those who wanted a way to fortify themselves from Ogboni recruitment drives. To illustrate the political nature of this development, the Oba reversed himself when he wrote a letter in 1962 (having since left the Action group) to the government saying he no longer had any concerns about Owegbe (see below).
At the same time, the national wing of the NCNC was seeking to wean itself from its dependence on the Otu-Edo. It accused Otu-Edo of restricting choices for candidates in elections to Benin indigenes, to the detriment of resident Igbos who wanted to contest in Benin and represent the party at the center. This complaint was curious, considering that Chike Ekwuyasi, an Ibo speaking Midwesterner from Ogwashi-Uku was actually elected on Otu-Edo platform to represent Benin back in 1951 – and no Benin indigene had ever been elected from any Igbo district. Nevertheless, the party established the Orizu and Onyia Commissions of inquiry to probe Otu-Edo – resulting in a recommendation by J.I.G. Onyia of Asaba to dissolve Otu-Edo and replace it with straight party membership of the NCNC, also known as “NCNC simplicita.” The report also pointed out that Omo-Osagie had not held elections for the position of President-General of Otu-Edo since 1950. This aspect of the report was attractive to Omo-Osagie’s critics within Otu-Edo – like GI Oviasu, DEY Aghahowa etc, who then formed a faction called “NCNC pure.” Nevertheless, Omo-Osagie, leery of non-Edo based political parties, insisted that Otu-Edo would not be swallowed by any national party but would remain independent. [Oronsaye, Op. cit.]
Other noteworthy developments in 1959 include the decision of the NCNC to establish a Midwest secretariat in Benin and the emergence of the States creation issue in the campaigns for federal elections in December 1959. In that election, the Action Group – which said it would also support the creation of the Midwest, but only if it occurred simultaneously with states creation in other regions - won three out of fifteen seats in the Midwest, two of which were in Ishan (A. Enahoro and P.D. Oboh) and one in Afenmai (M. Obi). The other twelve federal legislators from the Midwest were all members of the NCNC, including A. Opia, U.O. Ayeni, E. A. Mordi, J.B. Eboigbodi, Jereton Mariere, J.K. Deomonadia, O. Oweh, Festus Okotie-Eboh, and N. A. Ezenbodor. In the Benin division, H.O. Osagie, D.N. Oronsaye and D.E.Y. Aghahowa secured the federal seats. (Daily Times, December 14, 1959, pp5-6). These legislators would all play crucial roles in the fight for the Midwest after independence. For example, Jereton Mariere, a distinguished member of the Urhobo Progress Union, and businessman who had managed the late Mukoro Mowoe’s business at Agbor, would later emerge the first Governor of the Midwestern region. [personal communication, Professor PP Ekeh]
1960
As was the case in previous years, 1960 was full of action, for and against the creation of the Midwest, including false and real hopes and intrigue. [Isuman JU. Facts about the Midwest State. Amalgamated Press, Lagos, 1960]
On July 7th, the Oni of Ife, Oba Adesoji Aderemi, became the Governor of the Western region while the Alake of Abeokuta became the President of the House of Chiefs. Chief Omo-Osagie wasted no time in making a public statement about the development. Oba Akenzua II, who had been generally snubbed and cut off from many day to day decisions in the Ministry of Midwest Affairs except his approval was important to some Machiavellian scheme or the other, finally had enough. Independence was approaching and the Midwest region had still not been created. The post-independence federal government was going to be formed by the NCNC and the NPC. The vast majority of the federal legislators from the Midwest belonged to the NCNC. Therefore, the Oba decided to abandon the Action group, resigning his position as a Minister without portfolio. By so doing, he realigned the traditional establishment with the “new elite” for the final push to secure the Midwest.
But shortly after he did so, the Action Group won 15 out of 30 seats from the Midwest in the Western House elections of August 8, 1960, even barely beating an Otu-Edo candidate in Benin as well Prince Shaka Momodu in Irrua, in what was regarded as an upset, perhaps influenced by manipulation of the 1959 voter’s register. This outcome emboldened Awolowo and Akintola to publicly declare that they would not support the creation of the Midwest until after the 1964 federal elections when they would be in power at the center – although they kept up pressure for creation of the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers and Middle Belt States in other regions. Meanwhile, Barrister SO Ighodaro had taken over the Ministry of Midwest Affairs from Anthony Enahoro, when the latter elected to go federal, having lost out to SLA Akintola who returned to the West to succeed Awolowo as the Premier.
The 1960 constitution specified that for a referendum to take place seeking to establish support for a new region, two-thirds majority must approve it in the Federal House of Representatives and Senate, followed by majority approval in two-thirds of regions. Recognizing the key role which the governing party in the federal government in Lagos would have in initiating any legislative move toward the creation of the Midwest, Festus Okotie-Eboh and his mentor, Humphrey Omo-Osagie, were busy lobbying northern leaders. Eventually Festus Okotie-Eboh almost single handedly got Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu and Alhaji Ahmadu Bello of the NPC to agree in principle to make an exception for the Midwest based on its unique history, knowing they were generally opposed to States creation. Without this crucial achievement on the part of Chief Okotie-Eboh, the creation of the Midwest would have been dead in the water. It was in recognition of this strategic feat that Festus Okotie-Eboh was given a chieftaincy title in Benin,the Elaba of Uselu. Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie, the indefatigable fighter with whom Oba Akenzua II had had his ups and downs but whose firm resolve and loyalty to his people had stood the test of time, was conferred with the title of Iyase of Benin. [Egharevba, Op. Cit.]
Nevertheless, the Akintola government in Ibadan moved quickly to consolidate its gains. It appointed many Midwesterners to ministerial positions, created a Midwest minority area and advisory council, and reorganized its administrative structure to create six new regional conferences, as if in tacit recognition of the six regions it was canvassing for the country. Chief Anthony Enahoro became the Chairman of the Midwest regional executive – which did not include Akoko-Edo district and Warri division. Dalton Ogieva Asemota, a well known independent, distinguished retiree from the United African Company (UAC), personal friend of Oba Akenzua II and first Chairman of the Midwest Advisory Council, became appointed by the Western region as the first post-independence Senator from Benin Province in Lagos, while Senator M.G. Ejaife, a household name in Urhoboland, was appointed to represent the Delta.
Dennis Osadebay, leader of the Midwest State movement, left Ibadan for Lagos to take up his new position as Senate President, to replace Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had become the Governor-General. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh became the Federal Minister of Finance and leader of the parliamentary party. The straight shooting Michael Okpara replaced Nnamdi Azikiwe as Premier of the Eastern region and leader of the NCNC. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa of the NPC became the Prime Minister. Alhaji Ahmadu Bello held fort in the Northern region.
The ducks were lining up in a row.
1961-62
The years 1961 and 1962 moved with dizzying speed. At the Midwest regional conference of the AG, Chief Awolowo kept up his oft repeated statement that he would work for the simultaneous creation of the Midwest, COR and Middle Belt States. In the Midwest, however, his comments were regarded with skepticism, all the more so considering what was regarded as his preference for a balkanized version of the Midwest. In any case, in March 1961, the NCNC – urged by Chief Okotie-Eboh - formally opposed the exclusion of Akoko-Edo and Warri from the Midwest minority area. When Chief Awolowo was confronted with the commitment the Western regional House of Assembly had made to creation the entire Midwest back in 1955 by approving the Sowole motion, he replied that he was no longer bound by that motion because the country was under colonial rule at the time [Federal Parliamentary debates, April 4, 1961]. The comment merely served to confirm suspicions that he did not support the creation of the Midwest – under any circumstances – even though he challenged Balewa to create the Midwest before the end of May 1962.
Meanwhile, back in the Midwest, the NCNC and Action Group were locking horns in increasingly aggressive confrontation between party thugs regarding the alleged misuse by the AG of customary courts and tax assessments to harass political opponents, particularly in Ishan division, where the pro-Midwestern Prince Shaka Momodu was active, but just as much elsewhere [West African Pilot, August 30, 1961]. In the near crisis atmosphere that this created in the Midwest, Michael Okpara and the NCNC wanted the Balewa government to declare a state of emergency in the West, but Balewa resisted the temptation, seeing as it had other problems on its hands such as the controversy over the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact and the Congo controversy. Balewa also wanted to reach out to the Action Group during this period.
On April 4th, 1961, what is now known in history as the first Midwest motion was moved and carried by voice acclamation in the federal House of Representatives [Federal Parliamentary Debates, 4 April, 1961, col. 802]. It was a private member’s motion, which would run into legal trouble later because no formal count had been taken, as constitutionally required, of those in favor or against, and many complained that they had left the council chamber before the voice vote was taken. The April 1961 Midwest motion in the federal legislature was followed by initial approval in June 1961 in the Eastern region and in September 1961 in the Northern region. During this period newspaper articles written by AG loyalists appeared in which various ethnic groups of the proposed Midwest were warned of “Benin domination.” In the smear campaign, designed to derail Midwest unity, rumors were spread about how certain posts were going to be dominated by “Benin.”
In early 1962, Dr. Okpara’s plans for a contrived state of emergency in the Midwest petered out, reportedly because it had been leaked by a reporter. In February, faced with what seemed to be a constitutional certainty, the AG met with the NCNC in Lagos, in order to get an agreement on the proposed Midwest Constitution Act which would respect its views on what should constitute the Midwest. By this time it was obvious that the first Midwest motion was inadequate because no vote count was taken. Therefore, on March 22nd, 1962, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa introduced thesecond Midwest motion.
Late on March 23rd, 1962, Senator Dalton Asemota of the Benin province received an important visitor in his apartment at the federal legislator’s Legco Flats in Victoria Island, Lagos. His visitor was none other than Chief Anthony Enahoro, Vice President of the Action Group and leader of the Midwest Regional Executive. Enahoro stayed on in Senator Asemota’s flat until the early hours of the morning lobbying him to adopt the party position of the AG to vote against the second Midwest motion. The Senator, who was not a party man, was nonetheless reminded that he owed his position to the goodwill of the Action Group government in Ibadan. Early on the 24th, late Senator Asemota’s wife, late Mrs. Onaiwu Asemota (nee Obinwa family of Onitsha) rushed to my parent’s house to report the conversation Enahoro had with Senator Asemota. On this basis, the Senator’s brother in Benin, late Pa Elekhuoba Asemota was contacted emergently by phone with a report of what had transpired. My parents rushed to the Senator’s flat to ask him whether he had decided to oppose the motion. The late Senator, to his eternal credit, smiled and told my parents, “Do not worry, my children, even if it costs me this position, I shall not act against the interests of my people.” (personal communication, GO Omoigui)
After overcoming an attempt by Action group legislators, therefore, to amend the motion by deleting Akoko-Edo, Warri and western Ijaw from the definition of “Midwest” and then obfuscate issues by adding the creation of 11 new states as a pre condition, the Federal House of Representatives and Senate approved the second Midwest motion by 214-49 on March 24, 1962. The final count-down had begun.
Six days later on March 30th, 1962 the Midwest referendum Bill was passed. It was followed on April 17th and 18th by the Midwest Parliamentary Bill which specified the addition of Akoko-Edo, Warri and Western Ijaw areas to the proposed Midwest. No sooner did this vote take place than Barrister S. O. Ighodaro, Attorney General of the Western region, went to court to challenge the validity of the Midwest Parliamentary Bill and the Eastern region’s approval of the federal Midwest Bill. Separately, the Olu of Warri and Chief Reece Edukugho filed court proceedings to contest the inclusion of Warri in the Midwest.
Meanwhile, on April 4th the Eastern region passed the second Midwest motion, followed on April 5th, by the Northern region. On April 13th, a counter-motion was passed by the Western House of Assembly, opposing the federal Midwest motion [Daily Times, April 14, 1962].
In May 1962, an important development occurred within the Western region and Action Group which would open the way for the Midwest to bolt out of the West. A crisis erupted between Chiefs Obafemi Awolowo (Party Leader and Leader of the Federal Opposition in Lagos) and Samuel Akintola (Premier of the West). This crisis had many causes [Sanya Onabamiro, Glimpses into Nigerian History. MacMillan Nigeria, 1983. p149]. For one, the positions of party leader (Awolowo) and head of government in the western region (Akintola) were held by two different persons, one from the non-Oyo group of rain forest Yorubas (Awolowo from Ijebu) and the other from the Oyo group of savannah Yorubas (Akintola from Ogbomosho). Secondly, Akintola felt that Awolowo ought not to have allowed any competition with him as “deputy leader” for the position of Premier when Awolowo left Ibadan to go to Lagos as Federal Leader of Opposition at the end of 1959. Thirdly, control over spending of the Cocoa Marketing Board investment funds built up during the Second World War from caused friction between them. Fourthly, they disagreed over whether to accept an invitation by Prime Minister Balewa for the Action Group to join the federal government. In this proposal, Balewa intended for Awolowo to be deputy-Prime Minister and Minister for Finance – which would have displaced Okotie-Eboh from that position. To all of this was added the undercurrent of a serious conflict between their wives.
On April 19, 1962, one day after S. O. Ighodaro went to court on behalf of the Akintola government to challenge the Midwest motion, Chief SL Akintola was expelled from the Action Group by Chief Obafemi Awolowo after an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation. The Governor of the West, Sir Adesoji Aderemi was advised by a majority of Action Group legislators at Ibadan to dismiss Akintola as Premier and replace him with Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro – an act that was challenged all the way up to the Privy Council in London. On May 26, 1962 an attempt by the Western House to meet and ratify Akintola’s dismissal ended in confusion, leading to Police intervention. Armed with his wet handkerchief as an antidote to teargas, V.E. Amadasun was one of the first to rush to Lagos from Ibadan to inform the Midwest community in the federal government of the development, which led to the eventual declaration of a State of Emergency in the West on May 29 [Federation of Nigeria Official Gazette, supplement to No. 38, Vol. 49, May 29, 1962]. Although the Privy Council eventually approved the Governor’s action, its “approval” had been overtaken by events in Nigeria because of a constitutional amendment by the Federal House of Representatives. Meanwhile, under the “emergency administration” of the West led by Senator MA Majekodunmi, a fresh slate of predominantly pro-Midwest Midwesterners became ministers, including Mark Uzorka, T. E. Salubi, Webber Egbe, A. Y. Eke etc, with Oba Akenzua II and the Olu of Warri as “advisers.” It was the emergency administration in the West which gave the Western region’s approval for the Midwest referendum to proceed.
In May, there was an All-party Midwest conference in Benin at which Senator Dalton Asemota of Benin was made Chairman of the Midwest United Front Committee (UFC). The conference – which was boycotted by most members of the Action Group - was a confidence building measure designed to iron out party differences and differences between ideological and ethnic interest groups. The conference resulted in the creation of many committees to plan for the future Midwest. In addition to the UFC, these committees were the constitutional and legal, finance and general purposes, civil service, delimitation, and minority protection committees.
In June, the Majekodunmi regime filed a motion to withdraw the court cases that were pending against the Midwest motion. Both motions were eventually dismissed in July by the Supreme Court.
On September 9th, there was another all-party round-table at the Oba’s Palace in Benin which most members of the Action Group, except Ja Isuman and JE Odiete boycotted. At this meeting, a 75 man Midwest Planning Committee including all Midwest legislators at regional and federal levels was created. It too was chaired by Senator Dalton Asemota, assisted by EB Edun-Fregene, JAE Oki, Dr. Christopher Okojie, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Dennis Osadebay and Humphrey Omo-Osagie. Various sub-committee chairmen were Olisa Chukwura for the constitutional and legal, Chief A. Y. Eke for the finance and general purposes, J.I.G. Onyia for the civil service, Chief Obasuyi for delimitation, Ja Isuman for the Plebiscite, and Chief Odiete for minority protection. About one week later a new political party called the Midwest Peoples Congress (MPC) was formed. It was allied to the Northern Peoples Congress and led by Apostle Edokpolo. [Vickers, Op. Cit.]
A week later on September 22, Chief Awolowo and many others were arrested for an apparent plot to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Balewa. Chief Anthony Enahoro initially escaped into exile in Ireland but was extradited back to Nigeria in May 1963 to stand trial.
With the Promised Land in sight, there was need for all resources to be mobilized for known and unknown threats during the referendum. Therefore, Oba Akenzua II wrote an interesting letter to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Midwest Affairs on October 2nd, 1962, in which he said:
Dear Permanent Secretary,
Your MWP144/358 of 26/9/62. I do not now see any justification for the continued ban on “Owegbe”. I, therefore, support the suggestion that the ban on “Owegbe” should be lifted. I recommend that the ban on “Owegbe” in the Benin Division and elsewhere should be lifted.”
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) Oba of Benin
(see Exhibit 63/5 p143, Owegbe Commission of Inquiry, 1966)
1963
With unity and security on the home front, all hands were now on deck for the final push. Balewa had decided that he would not conduct the referendum until there was a formal government back in office at Ibadan. By order of the federal government, the Akintola government was reinstated on January 1st, 1963 as Premier, this time with support from a new coalition consisting of the NCNC and his new party called the United People’s Party (UPP). This action caused an additional misunderstanding within the old Action Group just as it was reeling from the report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry into management of Cocoa Marketing Board investments and newspaper coverage of the ongoing trial of Chief Awolowo and others for treasonable felony [Enahoro, Op. Cit.].
On January 21, Mr. Gabriel E. Longe, from Owan district of the Afenmai Division was appointed the Supervisor of the Midwest referendum. He had been the legal adviser to the Benin Delta Peoples Party back in the fifties. No civil servants from the Western region were to be selected (to avoid a conflict of interest or fear of victimization) and no non-Midwesterners were to be given any significant roles in the exercise. Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was the link man to the Prime Minister to make sure there were no mistakes at federal level.
A few days later on January 24th, the Midwest Planning Committee met again to get updates on developments and plan for the referendum. Two days later, on January 26th, KSY Momoh, who had taken over from Chief Anthony Enahoro as Chairman of the Midwest Regional Committee of the Action Group publicly announced that the Action group would oppose the creation of the Midwest, but, unknown to him, the horse had left the barn. On February 23rd, Midwestern dissenters from the Action group and elements of the Midwest State Movement and NCNC entered a secret pact to make sure the Midwest referendum was hitch free. Faced with a choice between the party and their region, and urged on by appeals from Senator Dalton Asemota, many opted for their region. Under such pressure Action Group hardliners and anti-Midwest region politicians like KSY Momoh, C. Akere and Olatunji Oye, who were all former Ministers under Akintola before the split in the AG, decided to attend the next meeting of the Midwest Planning Committee (MPC) on March 9th. [Vickers, Op. Cit.]
Thereafter, Oba Akenzua II resumed his tours of the Midwest to garner support for the “Yes” vote. He was quoted as saying,
“Whoever does not drop his or her ballot paper into the WHITE ballot box will be condemned by future generations. Even those who die before the plebiscite takes place will be condemned in the other world, if they die with the bad intention of voting against or persuading people to vote against the creation of a Midwest region.” [Speech by Oba Akenzua at Agbor, March 12, 1963]
On April 23rd, Mr. James Otobo, a pro-Midwest politician
who had decamped from the NCNC to the AG before
independence and had since crossed over to the UPP
requested for a postponement of the referendum pending
clarification of certain issues. Therefore, another meeting of
the Midwest Planning Committee was called on May 20th,
followed by yet another meeting on May 30th at which final
agreement was reached on the creation of new divisions for
the Akoko-Edo and Isoko people, as well as the composition
of the interim Midwest administration.
In the meantime, on May 2nd, tragedy struck. Senator
Dalton Ogieva Asemota, Chairman of the Midwest Planning
Committee died suddenly.
THE DEATH OF SENATOR DALTON ASEMOTA
At the end of April 1963, Senator Asemota came to Lagos to
attend a scheduled meeting of the Senate. The Senate
adjourned on April 29th, and so he made plans to return to
Benin on May 2nd. On May 1st, however, he woke up early
and telephoned his older brother Pa Elekhuoba Asemota to
tell him that he would be returning to Benin the next day.
Then he went to the General Hospital in Lagos to see Dr.
Laja in follow-up to a Chest X-ray he had earlier ordered.
Dr. Laja gave him a prescription, some of which the Hospital
pharmacy did not have, so he was asked to find them at a
private pharmacy. From the hospital he went shopping but
returned home at about 3 pm to take his medications on an
empty stomach. After this he left for the Commercial
Medicine Store on Nnamdi Azikiwe Street owned by his
friend, Senator Wusu from Badagry. On arrival he handed
the prescription to his friend who in turn gave it to his
assistants to get the medications. Meanwhile Senator
Asemota was resting on the counter along with his wife,
Onaiwu, waiting on the prescription. Then suddenly, and
without warning he slumped.
He was then rushed to the General Hospital Casualty
department. His wife then came to my family house on
MacDonald Avenue in Ikoyi, Lagos, where we were
neighbours to Chief Anthony Enahoro on our back side and
Dr. Rilwan, a well known Lagos physician, on the other. Dr.
Rilwan, my parents, and Mrs Onaiwu Asemota rushed back
to the hospital to find out what was happening, only to be
directed to the mortuary where the Senator’s lifeless body
was lying. It was my father that had the unenviable
responsibility to break the devastating news to Chiefs Omo-
Osagie and Okotie-Eboh. Chief Omo-Osagie notified Pa
Elekhuoba Asemota in Benin.
Meanwhile, my father went to Dr. Laja’s house to get
permission for release and embalmment. While on their way
to the hospital the Doctor said the Senator had had an
enlarged Heart on Chest X-ray. When Senator Asemota
asked him how his Chest X-Ray looked, he told him: “It is
okay, Papa.” to which the Senator responded by smiling.
Senator Dalton Asemota, the consensus builder, did not live
to see the Midwest he worked so hard to make possible.
Descended from Chief Osemwota, the Eson, and a
descendant of the Ezomo Nehenua family of Benin, and
Madam Iyeye Ero, the later Senator was buried in the
Asemota family compound after a sermon led by Reverend
Akinluyi at the St. Matthew’s Cathedral in Benin City
[personal communication, Mr. DA Omoigui]. He was
replaced as Chairman of the Midwest Planning Committee
by Chief Morgan Agbontaen.
ACTIVITIES AT THE OBA'S PALACE AND AT
WARD LEVEL IN PREPARATION FOR THE
REFERENDUM
Once it became apparent that the referendum was indeed
going to be held, a tactical forward HQ was established at
the Oba's Palace, Benin City. Representatives of the
Midwest State Movement met there regularly for briefing.
At one of the early meetings Oba Akenzua II warned all
concerned that it was a rare event indeed for a government to
lose a referendum in its area of jurisdiction. He reminded
them that in 1962 General DeGaulle had conducted a
successful referendum for a new constitution in France.
The government of reference in the Midwest, Oba Akenzua
II was referring to, was that of the Western region, which,
inspite of public pretensions Oba Akenzua said, was opposed
to the creation of the new region. He told those gathered
that no stone must be left unturned to ensure victory in this
last lap of what he said was a war of liberation. Midwest
patriots like the late Israel Amadi-Emina, Senior Divisional
Adviser for the Benin and Delta provinces to the Western
region Government were in regular attendance, at a risk to
their civil service careers in the western region, explaining
the inside mechanics of Action group rigging methods. It
was from him and others in the system that all the
administrative traps in the 1959 voters’ register were learnt,
including fake names that had been planted there at the time
of the voters’ registration in 1959. Without knowing the
number and identity of the fake names, he explained, it
would be impossible to get 60% of those registered after
accounting for “No” votes. It was not the intention of those
who wrote such difficult clauses into the constitution that any
new region would ever be created.
Quite apart from open campaigning for voters to vote
"YES", as well as tours to various parts of the Midwest,
detailed operational plans were made to ensure victory on
polling day. Fleets of Armels buses, for example, were
leased by Chief Humphrey Omo-Osagie and sent around the
Benin province in operational support. The Otu-Edo party
machine went into high gear. Prince Shaka Momodu and his
“militia” were on alert. The Owegbe society was completely
mobilized.
The Urhobo Progress Union used every avenue
known to man, including churches, to mobilize voters. Turn-
out at ward level all over the state was planned to be close to
100% to make up for unknown ghost voters.
About two weeks prior to the official referendum, to
minimize uncertainty, at every potential polling station in
every ward vote forecasts were generated by Midwest
enthusiasts, based on a pre-referendum poll. Records were
meticulously collected from hut to hut and house to house
and recorded with entries for "Total Electors", "Total
entitled to vote (based on the 1959 federal register)",
"Number of people dead (since the 1959 federal elections)",
"Number of people that have left the area (since the 1959
federal elections)", "Number of people likely to vote 'Yes'",
and "Number of people likely to vote 'No'." On this basis
detailed plans were made to target potential "No" votes to
convince them otherwise, through education, direct lobbying,
and traditional sanctions. Many of such "No" votes had been
confused by conflicting campaigns to vote against the
creation of the Midwest by some interests. Anti-Midwest
campaigners told villagers that putting their votes in the “
white box”, was a vote for return to the rule of “white men”.
Pro-Midwest campaigners told villagers that a vote in the
“black box” was a vote for “Evil”.
But more mundane methods were also used to campaign.
For example, in one case, the retired Head of a Household
asked his visitor what the whole referendum controversy was
about. What, he wondered, was he to gain from going to the
polling station at his age? The Midwest protagonist he spoke
to explained it very simply in this way: If the referendum
were to approve the creation of the Midwest, he would no
longer have to travel all the way to Ibadan to collect his
pension. All he would have to do was to go to Benin City
nearby. The old man thought about what he had just heard
and said: "In that case my son, everybody in this house will
go there and vote 'Yes'.”
In yet another case, this time in Benin City itself, a local
ward leader of the Action Group was approached by some
colleagues in the Action Group to notify him that party
policy was to oppose the creation of the Midwest. The
gentleman concerned calmly told his visitors that it would be
sacrilege for him to go against the wishes of Oba Akenzua II.
From June 5th until June 14th, and again from June 20th until
the 25th, massive campaign tours were undertaken by the
MSM, led by Dennis Osadebay. On July 1st, Michael
Okpara, Premier of the Eastern region, came on tour to
encourage the people of the Midwest to vote “Yes”. Also in
attendance during the referendum were many other NCNC
national leaders who were made interim divisional team
leaders. They included GC Mbanugo, TOS Benson, RA Fani
Kayode (who had since decamped from the AG), RA
Akinyemi, KO Mbadiwe, Akinfosile, as well as Okotie Eboh
and Omo Osagie. On or about July 10th, with all the signs
pointing to a successful referendum, even Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, leader of the Action Group, faced with dissension
within the ranks of the Midwest Action Group, sent a note
from prison to his supporters urging them to vote “Yes.”
(Vickers, Op. Cit.)
THE BAUCHI MEETING: OKOTIE-EBOH AND
BALEWA’S SECOND THOUGHTS
On the surface, all had seemed set to go for the referendum,
once all the legislative bills had been passed and the
supervisor appointed. Behind the scenes, however, Chief SL
Akintola had been warning some of friends in the NPC that
they were setting a precedent by supporting the creation of
the Midwest region which would someday come back to
haunt the North. It seemed clear to Akintola that if the
Midwest referendum was allowed to go forward, the
Midwest would, indeed, opt out of the West. Once the
Midwest was so created, a precedent would have been set for
the creation of other regions, a prospect that was not
attractive to the northern leadership. On this basis, Prime
Minister Tafawa Balewa began to have second thoughts.
In the last week of May 1963, the supervisor of the
referendum, GE Longe was summoned for what he thought
was another of his routine briefings for the Prime Minister.
At this meeting, which took place in Bauchi, rather than
Lagos, he witnessed a private show down between Okotie-
Eboh and Balewa. Okotie-Eboh insisted that he had
received Sardauna’s commitment, things had gone too far
and that Balewa could not back out. After a hot exchange,
Balewa conceded to Okotie-Eboh and gave the final go
ahead for the referendum [personal communication,
Kenneth Longe, Benin City]
THE REFERENDUM DIARY
The Midwest was divided into eight districts for the purpose
of the official referendum. They were Aboh, Afemai, Asaba,
Benin, Ishan, Urhobo, Warri and Western Ijaw. Counting
Stations for each of these districts were located at the
Recreation Hall, Kwale; Town Hall, Auchi; Council Hall,
Asaba; Conference Hall (Urhokpota), Benin City; Town
Hall, Irrua; Council Hall, Ughelli; K.G.V. Memorial Hall,
Warri; and the Court Hall, Bomadi, respectively.
The diary below was developed from interviews with and the
personal records of Mr. D. A. Omoigui, Assistant District
Referendum Officer for Benin NE (I) in what is now known
as Uhumwode local government area.
April 6th, 1963
Upon arrival on April 6th, 1963, at the headquarters of the
Referendum at Kings Square, Benin City, the Supervisor
welcomed all referendum officers. The Secretary to the
Supervisor (Mr. G. B. A. Egbe) then provided each officer
with copies of the Constitutional Referendum Act, 1962 and
Constitutional Referendum Regulations, 1963 along with
Circular No. 1 which contained “General Instructions. ”
The eight major Districts identified for the Referendum were
placed under District Referendum Officers (DRO). Each
district was divided into Constituencies. Assistant District
Referendum Officers (ADRO) were operationally
responsible for the conduct of the exercise in each
constituency which were further subdivided into wards and
finally, 1,841 polling stations.
The ADRO was responsible for providing the name and
address of each polling station as
well as the staff. At each polling station, there was a
Presiding Officer, two Polling Officers, one Orderly and one
female searcher in reserve. For each polling station the
ADRO reconciled the 1959 Federal Electoral register for
that station and provided it to the Presiding Officer for use in
verifying the legitimacy of individual voters on polling day.
The ADRO was also responsible for instructing Polling
Officers in their duties, providing all equipment to be used
and ensuring that all ballot boxes were delivered to the
District Referendum Officer at the counting center. The
DRO on the other hand was responsible for coordination in
addition to conducting the count at the counting center. Only
he had the legal authority to open each ballot box, but he was
allowed to delegate that responsibility to the ADRO if
necessary. At the end of the Referendum every officer was
expected to submit a report on his work.
Public information leaflets with directions on “How to
Vote” were printed at the Nigerian National Press, Ltd on
Malu road, Apapa, in Lagos. Voters were instructed on eight
basic steps:
1. Find out where your Polling Station is (same as it was in 1959)
2. Find out when Polling day is. (To be announced by the Prime Minister)
3. Go to the Polling Station.
4. Go to the table where the Polling Officers are sitting. (Show your card or provide your name, address and registration number, subject to challenge by any of the polling agents representing various political parties)
5. Have your left forefinger marked with special ink.
6. Take your officially stamped ballot paper. (Your registration card will also be stamped)
7. Go to the screened compartment and place your ballot in either the white box for YES or the Black Box for NO.
8. Leave the Polling Station.
Thursday April 18th, 1963
The Supervisor welcomed all referendum officers back to
Benin City. Based on advance reports, claims for
reimbursement according to standard civil service rules were
received from officers and requested financial advances
made to enable them discharge their duties. Some had
trekked for many miles through bush paths infested with wild
animals just to identify polling station locations. Others had
the problem of dealing with a low proportion of all-season
motorable roads and made requests for back-up LandRovers.
Then there was the little detail of paying for supervising
presiding officers who either had cars or motor-cycles, rather
than those who would need transportation arrangements.
This was necessitated by concerns about communication,
particularly during rains.
Having secured the names of all polling stations and names of
officers (recruited locally) expected to man them, as well as
reconciled voters’ lists, the officers were now ordered to
begin an intensive lecture tour for all polling officers.
Booklets containing detailed, standardized instructions were
distributed to ADROs who were expected in turn to give
them to Presiding and Polling Officers. Such pamphlets
included “Instructions to Polling Officers”, “Instructions to
Referendum Officers” and guidelines developed for “Law
and Order”.
The DROs on the other hand were charged with preparing
the ballot boxes and polling compartments. Boxes were
brought from Lagos, then cleaned. Their clips, nobs, nutches
and locks were tested for efficacy. Each Referendum Officer
was given two delicate specially designed security keys and
then trained how to use them.
Between April 18th and 20th, Mr. Egbe organized additional
short lectures on various aspects of their duties. Clarification
was provided, for example, for use of two voters' lists in sub-
divided wards. Further instructions were issued by the
Supervisor regarding the importance of ensuring that the
exact number of voters in the register for each polling station
was precise and could be defended in court. They were then
ordered to return to their districts and constituencies until the
next scheduled meeting on Monday May 13th, 1963.
In the Uhumwode District Council area, the ADRO, Mr. D.
A. Omoigui, conducted lectures to polling officials at 10 am
and 4 pm respectively, at the Council Hall, Ehor and the
Eyaen Court Hall on Tuesday 23rd and Friday 26th of April.
May 13th, 1963
The meeting of DROs and ADROs originally scheduled for
May 13th had to be put off until May 20th because the
Supervisor had been invited to a meeting of representatives
of political parties of the Midwest at Prime Minister Tafawa
Balewa’s house in Lagos on the same day. At that meeting,
party representatives from the NCNC, AG, MPC and UPP
requested assurances that they could discuss any concerns
about arrangements for the referendum with the Supervisor,
including compliance with the referendum regulations. They
also wanted clarification about the powers of their polling
agents and their ability to raise objections about specific
Referendum Officers and polling officials with alleged party
sympathies which might be detrimental to their cause. The
Prime Minister directed the Supervisor to keep all parties
informed of his activities.
May 20th, 1963
On May 20, 1963, his referendum officers submitted the
ratified figures based on an audit of voters projected for each
polling station to the Supervisor. Residual problems with the
inspection and testing of ballot boxes were reported for
Benin City, Ubiaja, Warri and Ughelli and arrangements
made to address them. The list of locations where new
polling booths were to be constructed and the associated
costs were obtained. There were discussions about line item
costs of contracting private typists and hiring of outboard
engines in riverain areas. Officers were warned against any
non-neutral activities, which might bring the referendum into
disrepute. They were alerted that the Supervisor could
change lists of polling officers recommended if there were
complaints of favoritism. Having been directed to continue
lectures to Polling Officers, work to get all ballot boxes
ready, arrangements for construction of polling booths and
compartments, and packaging of equipment for each polling station, they were asked to return on Monday June 10thfor
further instructions. It was expected that the referendum
might take place at the end of June.
June 10th, 1963
At this meeting it was made clear that the referendum would
not take place in June as earlier hoped. Discussion focused
on estimates for construction of screens and booths. The
Supervisor expressed concern that in the past, such items
were discarded after elections. He expressed the hope that
the use of anti-termite frames would enhance reusability and
save money. He also directed the officers to ensure that all
materials and equipment supplied for the referendum was
returned in good condition. They were expected to plan this
ahead and rehearse their plans, in order to identify transport
and security requirements.
Instructions for the counting of votes were then issued. The
procedure was rigidly spelled out to the Referendum Officers
as follows:
1. All boxes, envelopes and articles delivered by the Presiding Officers were to be checked.
2. The Returning Officer would then be given the statement of invalid papers.
3. An accounting was then to be made of unused ballot papers, unused tendered ballot papers, spoilt ballot papers
and canceled papers.
4. At this point the returning officers would be provided pencils, clips and forms for “Record of Votes.” (Form C1)
5. The seal on each Ballot box was then to be broken, the box unlocked and its contents emptied on the counting
table, after which the returning officer begins counting the
ballots, face upwards in bundles of 100 each, removing any
further invalid papers.
6. If ballots were unmarked with official markings or issued in a different polling station they were to be
rejected, and the word “rejected” written boldly on them.
If any rejection was contested by a party counting agent the
phrase “Rejection objected to” was to be inscribed under
the word “Rejected.”
7. At this point the returning officer would complete the ‘Record of Votes’, sign and hand it over to the ADRO
along with unsealed envelopes containing rejected and
counted papers from the WHITE and BLACK boxes.
8. Then the ADRO would tally the total number of votes in each box, total number of valid votes, and the number of
rejected papers.
9. After each of two boxes from every polling station had been counted and tallied, the numbers for the
constituency were to be totalled and reconciled with the
numbers of ballot papers and boxes originally provided to
each polling station and the constituency as well as the
Voters’ register.
10. At this point the statement would be signed and dated by the ADRO
11. Form C2, containing all figures, was then to be
declared publicly for that constituency and a copy sent to the
DRO.
Before parting ways to their specific zones of responsibility,
they were reminded to continue training polling officers,
preparing ballot boxes and building up parcels of equipment
for each polling station. It was anticipated that they would
meet again on Monday July 1st.
On June 12th, 1963, however, the Prime Minister announced
on radio that the long awaited Midwest referendum would
take place on Saturday, July 13th, 1963. Therefore, all
Referendum Officers were summoned back to Benin City.
June 13th, 1963
At this meeting detailed instructions were issued regarding
the impending referendum. The Supervisor, Mr. GE Longe,
did not attend because he had to go to Lagos for an
assignment. As a result, he made arrangements to make field
trips to various locations between June and July 13th.
His address at the meeting was read out in his behalf. To
ensure authenticity, he decided to restrict the power to
appoint polling agents to the Midwest Regional Secretaries
of the four recognized parties, namely the UPP, AG, NCNC
and MPC. He did so to avoid town or district secretaries
sending all sorts of unverifiable names. Of the four polling
agents approved in each polling station, two were for
political parties in favor of the creation and two for parties
against the creation of the Mid-West. A similar formula was
used for the Counting agents.
However, Referendum Officers were only authorized by law
to guide political parties in this process, if so requested by
the parties involved, but not actually solicit them to make
appointments.
For Law and Order, the Police was provided with the list of
all polling stations and their locations, as well as collecting
points for ballot boxes at the end of polling.
The ADRO (HQ), Mr. Edgal, was to distribute supplies of
public leaflets and posters to referendum officers. Officers
were expected to release these every week, assisted by the
Western region Ministry of Information and the Federal
Territory Ministry of Information.
Once again it was emphasized that DROs rehearse how to
open Ballot boxes during the count. Polling Screens were
supplied directly to those polling stations located on
motorable roads. For those which could be so reached or
which were located on bush paths that were not large enough
to allow porters carry the sticks on which the cloth screen
would be mounted, presiding officers were paid up to 10
shillings to make local arrangements in the bush for sticks.
Presiding Officers in remote unmotorable areas were also
charged with the construction of polling booths for a fee not
to exceed 4 pounds. For stations in villages on on motorable
roads (or accessible by an outboard launch or canoe), two
polling screens were to be used as a booth while sheds could
be constructed in front of the booth to reduce heat. Presiding
Officers were paid up to 15 shillings for each shed so
constructed.
On the basis of these guidelines Mr. Longe asked the Officers
to estimate the numbers of booths, bush sticks, and sheds they
would need in the more remote areas of the Midwest.
Because polling screens at that time were made out of anti-
termite timber and highly durable cloth, they cost the
Government over 3,000 pounds. Therefore, detailed
arrangements were made for their storage in the event of
future use after the referendum.
Officers were then told to put final touches to their list of
names of presiding, polling and returning officers. These
lists would then be used to prepare vouchers for their
remuneration. Formal certificates of appointment would also
be issued. Each returning officer was paid 7/6d.
June 24th, 1963
Mr. Longe addressed the DROs. A checklist of requirements
was itemized and reviewed. They were asked to collect the
certificates for polling and presiding officers, as well as the
certificates to be attached to each copy of the voters’ lists
given to each presiding officer. Arrangements were
completed with Messrs Edgal and Odikpo for the
transportation of polling screen frames, as well as collection
of ballot boxes, publicity materials, materials and equipment
for the counting centers. Addresses of collecting centers
were confirmed and transport arrangements reviewed for
collection of Ballot boxes and polling equipment at the end
of the poll. Names of counting clerks and other polling
officials were confirmed.
Finally, DROs were told to return on July 1st along with
their ADROs.
July 1st, 1963
At this crucial meeting, a number of last minute details were
clarified and rehearsed. The list of equipment for each
Counting Center was rehashed. Lists of packeted articles for
use at each polling station and items to be handed over to
ADROs by presiding officers at the close of polling were
reviewed. In addition to handing over count results, along
with all envelopes, articles, ballot boxes and keys used at
polling and counting stations, ADROs were charged to write
post-mortem reports on the referendum in their various
constituencies, explaining any particular difficulties
encountered and making suggestions for future improvement.
Mr. Longe issued a general approval of all the counting
clerks, orderlies and female searchers that had been
nominated. In larger towns ballot papers were to be
distributed on the morning of the poll. In scattered but
motorable areas, ballot papers were to be distributed the
evening before at identified central locations to presiding
officers. For very remote areas, including villages located
deep inside the Delta, referendum officers were advised to
make arrangements to collect their ballot papers from the
Referendum HQ a few days prior, subject to arrangements
for security. Ballot paper stamps were issued to referendum
officers during the meeting but were not to be distributed
until the ballot papers were being given to presiding officers.
Officers were reminded once again to notify presiding
officers that unstamped ballot papers would be rejected
during the count.
The critical importance of the Ballot paper account was
again stressed, with emphasis on the need for appropriate
signatures appended by polling agents, presiding and
referendum officers. Another very important document Mr.
Longe was concerned about was the certified extract of the
Voters' list. Each extract was to be certified and officially
marked. Mr. Longe emphasized again and again the need for
referendum officers to think pro-actively and ensure that all
elements of the referendum could be defended in court. As
of this time political parties had not made their choices of
polling agents known but it was obvious that polling agents
would in fact be appointed by the time the referendum was
conducted.
Officers were directed to cross-check the adequacy of
lighting at their counting centers. Counting was expected to
begin once ballot papers arrived from individual
constituencies. Once results were collated and signed, they
were to be telephoned to phone number 326, the official
phone number for the Referendum Secretary (Mr. Egbe) in
Benin. Simultaneously, a special courier was to be physically
sent with the original signed and certified Form C2 to the
Secretary in Benin. (A copy of Form C2 was to be retained
by the ADRO and DRO on site).
Posters were to be put up at each polling station at least
seven (7) days prior to the referendum. Extra posters were
made available to replace those destroyed by rain or
removed by unscrupulous characters opposed to the
referendum.
Final lists of polling officials were accepted. Payment for
services was to be made as approved at the various counting
centers after close of polling.
For law and order, the Police expressed the opinion that it
would be unnecessary for referendum officials to be escorted
by the Police while moving around on polling day.
However, the Police promised to send out periodic patrols.
Therefore, Mr. Longe suggested that ADROs identify a
central location to their subordinates at which they could be
reliably reached. Whatever movements were to be
undertaken by the ADROs was to be prioritized, focusing in
particular on ensuring that all ballot boxes arrive safely at the
counting center. This unwillingness of the Police to provide
bodyguards for referendum officials prompted some
referendum officers to hire their own private bodyguards.
The DROs in particular were directed to move about their
districts in a supervisory role but were advised to use their
counting centers as their offices in order that they could be
reached if necessary, either by their ADROs, the Police, or
the Supervisor.
For transport, one lorry was allocated to every district
except riverain Western Ijaw which was supplied with motor
launches. The Lorries were to be used to distribute polling
equipment and materials and recollect them at the end of
polling. (Polling Screens were to be stored at central
locations at a cost of rental not to exceed 15 pounds yearly).
Alternative special arrangements were made for the
collection of ballot boxes.
Each counting center was alloted
several back-up vehicles and arrangements made to ensure
that no more than one collection trip was made by any one
vehicle. At about 4pm vehicles were to be deployed to the
farthest polling stations from the counting centers. At 7pm
these vehicles would then begin a preplanned, secure one-
way trip back to the counting station, stopping to pick up
ballot boxes at predesignated polling stations.
Lastly, officers were requested to return on July 19th,
following the referendum, for final debrief and audit prior to
departure back to their regular jobs on Monday July 22nd
1963.
POLLING DAY, July 13th, 1963
In most constituencies – except in the Benin and Asaba
divisions - polling went off without major problems. In
Benin City, Mr. C. Akere, a known Action Grouper,
reportedly kept coming in and out of the Headquarters of the
referendum on Ring Road with complaints, particularly
about the unexpected massive turn-out of voters. On each
occasion, Mr. Longe would ask him to bring evidence of
malpractice but he had none to show.
According to Mr. D. A. Omoigui, ADRO for Benin
NorthEast (I) there were few Police patrols in his
constituency. The Police stayed put at Ehor without
transport, cutting off polling officials in the Eyaen area from
any kind of formal security protection. Many were beaten
up or rough-handled by Action Group thugs who even tried
to prevent voters from voting. For example, Mr. H.R.A.
Iruegbae, then Presiding Officer at the Ugha Native
Authority School Idumwumgha was beaten and his plastic
bag seized. When the ADRO went to get Police at Ehor, he
found them at Adobadan.
The procession then returned to
Idumwungha where for unexplained reasons the Police
Officer in Charge, Mr. Izevbizua-Iyamu, refused to arrest the
thugs or clear them out of the polling station. This type of
Police behavior was not universal. At Ehor, for example,
another Police officer, one Mr. Omonudo, carried out his
security assignments with despatch and seriousness when
reports were made to him. At Orio, a privately hired
bodyguard called “Dogo” from Auchi physically threw
obstructionists out of the polling station when the Police did
not show up.
During counting at the Conference Hall in Benin, a special
representative of Chief Akintola who had been sent to “
monitor” the counting, was chased out of the Hall by
members of the Owegbe society, when it transpired that his
name was not on the official list of agents representing the
various political parties.
July 18th, 1963
After interim results from 22 out of 30 polling constituencies
had already shown on July 16th that over 60% voted “Yes”,
final results were released by Mr. Gabriel Esezobor Longe
on Thursday July 18th, 1963. Almost 90% of voters had
opted to leave the western region. Shortly, thereafter, there
was an attempt by the legal adviser to the Action Group,
Barrister SO Ighodaro, to file a motion contesting the
referendum. However, this was later withdrawn.
WHY WAS THERE OPPOSITION FROM SOME
KEY MIDWESTERNERS IN THE ACTION GROUP
TO THE CREATION OF THE REGION?
Those from Benin who opposed the creation of the Midwest
are best placed to explain their actions, party loyalty aside.
In an interview in the United States, Chief Anthony Enahoro
made reference to the fact that at a certain stage, Chief
Samuel Akintola was using the Midwest issue for internal
power play within the Action group. It is not clear whether,
this, therefore, was his reason for acting the way he did, as a
rival and opponent of Chief Akintola within the party. In
any case this would not explain his position on the matter
back in the fifties.
According to testimony by Phillip Obazee, who was in a
position to know what transpired in Action group circles
within his own ward in Benin,
“What may explain the "why" question as I know it from
my ward-level
intelligence gathering at that time are as follows: (1)
Trust - many people
in the Benin and Delta Provinces were very leery of the
NCNC agenda; (2)
Keep them in Check - the Igbos, like the Japanese in the
U.S.A in the 1980',
were buying major real estate holdings, owned most of
the businesses along
Forestry and Mission Roads, and were gaining very
strong grips on the
political and economic machinery of Benin Province; (3)
B2 (Chief Omo-Osagie) agenda and the politics of cult
intimidation
- some people were of the opinion then that Chief Omo-
Osagie and the politics of cult that his
followers were known for would perhaps soon hold the
Palace and the people
of Benin Province a hostage; (4) NPC opportunism and
Lagos Street
factor - it was not clear to many why the North would
have interest in the
creation of Mid-West with its attendant new-breed of "
money wadding"
opportunists (Was the North vying to be noticed because
of the Lagos
Street Factor?); (5) Free Education - many people were
afraid that free
elementary education practiced in Benin and Delta
Provinces could not be
sustained under Mid-West Region; and (6) 1897 factor -
the vestiges of the
defeat of the Binis in 1897 cannot be ruled out in the
metaphysical calculus
of asking the Binis to go against the political order of the
day, and the
Binis would for a long time continue to be laggards in
embracing new
political dispensations, particularly where those new
dispensations are
masterminded by leaders of checkered history.”
[personal communication, Edo-Nation Yahoogroup, December 8th, 2002]
AFTER THE REFERENDUM
In Ibadan, less than 48 hours afterwards, the Premier, SL
Akintola ordered civil servants of Midwestern origin to
leave, with less than 24 hours notice. As federal referendum
officers were returning to their places of work in Lagos on
July 22nd, long columns of vehicles carrying over 600
Midwestern families returning from Ibadan, jammed the
roads from Owo, and headed for Benin City. As one witness
put it, it was like the “great trek.”
For many months, Benin City became a large refugee camp
with Western region returnees squatting all over the place in
open fields, verandahs etc. There were very few quarters
and the sleepy old provincial capital with dusty untarred
roads had long been denied the kind of infrastructure that
could support such a sudden population influx. Drivers of
western region official vehicles disposed of their vehicles in
ways that depended on their place of origin. If they were
Yoruba, they tried to make it to Ifon just beyond the border.
If they were Midwesterners, they hid their vehicles within
Midwestern territory. As things turned out, to this day, the
Western region has never shared its joint assets with the
Midwest, a sub-region which accounted for one third of its
area and one quarter of its population. All these years the
Midwest (later Bendel State) has had to remain contented
with whatever fixed assets were physically on the ground as
of August 9, 1963 and could not be moved out. The Western
region and its successor States took what was left.
THE DEATH OF CHIEF GABRIEL ESEZOBOR
LONGE
On August 6, 1963, death came calling again. Gabriel
Esezobor Longe, the supervisor of the well organized
Midwest referendum and former legal adviser to the Benin
Delta Peoples party, died suddenly, in his sleep, in Benin
City. He was 59 years old. He had been born in 1904, and
was a successful teacher for many years before he went to
study law and was called to the Bar on August 20th, 1951
[personal communication, Kenneth Longe, Benin City].
AUGUST 9, 1963
According to testimony from the late Mr. Ebohon, driver to
the late Chief H Omo-Osagie, the only time he ever saw the
Iyase of Benin shed tears was when the Midwest was finally
created (personal communication, Dr. Obas Ebohon).
On August 9, 1963 Chief SL Akintola moved a motion in the
Western House of Assembly to excise the 30 regional
constituencies of the Midwest from the original 124
constituencies of the West [Daily Times, August 10, 1963].
The motion was seconded and carried. On August 12, 1963,
Chief D. C. Osadebay, at that time the President of the
Senate, was appointed Administrator for the new region.
Along with his new administrative team (Appendix 2) he
arrived in Benin from Lagos via Ibadan, on Saturday August
17th to resume duty [Daily Times, August 18, 1963]. When
he met Akintola at the Ibadan airport, Osadebay was
presented with a complete set of laws of Western Nigeria
and a beaded puff. On August 19th, Chief SL Akintola of
the Western region congratulated the 29 Midwestern
members of the Western House of Assembly and 28
Midwestern members of the House of Chiefs on the creation
of their new region [Daily Times, August 20, 1963]. On
August 27, 1963, the Administrative Council of Midwestern
Nigeria declared Benin City the capital and administrative
headquarters of the Midwestern region, in a move Dennis
Osadebay described as “appropriate”, since most
Midwesterners claimed ancestral origins from the ancient
city. On October 8, 1963 the Akoko-Edo and Isoko
divisions were created out of the Afenmai and Urhobo
divisions, respectively, in line with a pre-referendum
promise. On January 8, 1964, as the 6-month term of office
of the interim administration was coming to an end, Prime
Minister Tafawa Balewa moved the Midwest Act in the
Federal House of Representatives. The new Midwest
regional constitution, negotiated in great detail, contained
provisions for protection of ethnic minorities like the
Itsekiri.
Parliamentary elections were then held in the Midwest on
February 3rd, which the NCNC won with 53 out of 65 seats.
Thereafter, posts were shared in a zoning formula. Chief
Samuel Jereton Mariere was appointed Governor, while
Dennis Osadebay became the first Premier, and Oba
Akenzua II the President of the House of Chiefs. Mr. P.K.
Tabiowo became the first Speaker of the House of
Representatives. (See Appendix 3 for the list of names of the
first cabinet)
Post-Script
After the Midwest had been successfully created and was
fully functioning, there was an attempt in 1964-65 by KSY
Momoh, an Action Group operative, to get a court
injunction to declare the region illegal, based on criticisms of
the delimitation exercise that accompanied the creation of
the region. The suit was thrown out by then Chief Judge
Chike Idigbe (personal communication, Mr. KO Longe).
CONCLUSION
What began as a request to colonial authorities in 1926 from
Oba Eweka II, took on a sense of political urgency in 1948,
and was finally attained during the reign of his son, Akenzua
II, on August 9, 1963. On August 9, 1964, at the first
anniversary celebration of the Midwestern region, the first
Governor, Chief S J Mariere, said, among other things,
“I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that if,
in any sense, one single person could be said to be
responsible for a turning point, Oba Akenzua II must
be classified as one such person…..when, later this
evening, I invite all present to drink with me the toast
of the Federal republic and the toast of Midwestern
Nigeria, I am sure that, in some special way, we will
be drinking the toast of Oba Akenzua II, Uku
Akpolokpolo, Omo n’Oba n’Edo. Along with toast,
we will also be drinking the toast of other potentates
of Midwestern Nigeria who, in diverse ways and
fashions, in several nooks and corners, in places low
and high, in circumstances difficult and easy, have
contributed their quota and mite towards our
successful deliverance into the promised land, whose
first anniversary today we celebrate………In quite a
different vein we must also remember those great
men and women who toiled and sweated on the
journey to this land of our fathers but died in harness
when already the land was in sight. Today, I am sure,
that the spirit of late Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota
and the soul of Chief Gabriel Esezobor Longe will
specially rejoice in their abode in the great
beyond…..” [Ayeni, P (Ed): Midwestern Nigeria
First Anniversary 1964. Ministry of Information,
Benin City]
In addition to Senator Dalton Ogieva Asemota and Chief
Gabriel Esezobor Longe, many of the great figures
mentioned in this essay have since died, some violently.
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the great enabler, was
assassinated during the January 15, 1966 coup. The story
I have related traces the origins of a determined
nationalist agitation, confident in its historical heritage,
pure in its strategic formulation, complex in its
operational implementation, but persistent nonetheless,
complete with the kind of ups and downs, promises and
betrayals that characterize all sustained human
endeavors. But, as I noted at the beginning, two lessons
stand out from the saga:
a). Political parties come and go, but nationalities
remain.
b). Organized and united across traditional and
contemporary forms of leadership, nothing can stand in
the way of the peoples of the Midwest.
Let us keep the lives of all the great Midwesterners
discussed today in our thoughts for all time. However,
let us not forget those non-Midwesterners who did their
part to make the Midwest constitutionally possible.
With the exception of the UN supervised separation of
Eritrea from Ethiopia after a long civil war, what those
who fought constitutionally for the Midwest achieved has
not been replicated in Africa.
Let us ask ourselves why, to this day, in Benin City and
other towns of the Midwest, later called Bendel, and now
Edo and Delta States by military fiat, many of our heroes
have never been honored or memorialized. Why are there
no statues, buildings, airports or prominent streets named
after many of these great men and women who achieved
the impossible? Why have they not been recommended
for post-humous awards?
It is my recommendation, therefore, that the Edo and
Delta Houses of Assembly should create a special award
titled “Hero of the Midwest” to be conferred on the
visionaries, strategists, operational and tactical leaders,
key allies and referendum officers whose efforts ensured
our “successful deliverance into the promised land.”
Furthermore, the history of the creation of the Midwest
should be taught in schools and a designated area should
be established in Benin to be named the “Midwest
Memorial”. The memorial should contain a small
museum, have statues of the most prominent fighters and
plaques dedicated to all those that made it possible.
On my part, as a son of Benin, in the Midwestern region
of Nigeria, on behalf of my generation and future
generations, I say to all of you alive or dead, who made it
possible, “Thank you.”
APPENDIX ONE
List of Referendum Officers and Assistant Referendum
Officers and their respective Areas
